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Ihe fmiieaVs letter
Julian C. McPheetbbs
The fall quarter at Asbury Theological Seminary oi)ened with an enroll
ment of one hundred eighty-seven students. This represents an increase of
twenty-seven percent over the enrollment of the fall quarter of 1945. Four
years ago, the enrollment was seventy for the same quarter.
The emergency measures taken by the building committee for additional
housing during the summer months, bore gratifying results at the opening of
the fall quarter. The committee provided for seventeen additional apartments
for married students, twenty G. I. houses for G. I. men, and fourteen addi
tional rooms for women students. The committee made provision for fifty-
one additional students, who otherwise could not be in the seminary this
year. This additional housing was provided at a cost of approximately seventy-
five thousand dollars.
One of the features which commands attention in our enrollment this year,
is the increase in the number of our women students. Thirty-two women
students are enrolled. Most of them are working for the degree. Master of
Religious Education. This is a new degree offered by the seminary and is
proving to be quite popular.
Wilder R. Reynolds, Ph.D., the new professor of Church History, delivered
his inaugural address at a convocation held on October the 17th. Commen
datory evaluations of his address on the subject, "The Church and the Crisis
in Religion," have come from numerous sources since its publication in the
fall issue of the Asbury Seminarian.
Clarence V. Hunter, A.B., B.D., is the new spiritual life counsellor for
the seminary. This new department has been added to the seminary this year
with the view of keeping the spiritual tone of the seminary at a high level. A
spiritual life survey was made of each student at the opening of the fall quar
ter. In this survey, ten percent of former students and fourteen percent of
new students indicated a definite need in specific spiritual life problems. These
problems are receiving the personal attention of the spiritual life counsellor
through the personal invitation of the students. It was under the supervision
of this department that a twenty-four hour period of prayer was arranged,
preceding the fall meeting of the Board of Trustees on October 18th. The
chain of prayer started at six a. m. and continued unbroken until six a. m. on
the following morning. Students and members of the faculty were coming
and going throughout the entire period. Some great victories were obtained
during this day of prayer.
Efforts are now being centered on the completion of the Morrison Memorial
Administration building, which is one of the four new buildings now in the
(Concluded on page 137)
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Under the Spell of An Idea
It is scarcely possible to over
estimate the rdle of ideas in the
achievement called History. Against
the view, so popular twenty years ago,
that human events are chiefly the out
come of the operation of economic and
sociological forces, has been placed in
more recent years an emphasis upon
the power of ideas to shape events and
to lend homogeneity to an epoch of
time. In this newer study mistakes
have been made. Some have, under the
spell of modern dynamism, personified
the movement of history and have
sought to understand it in the light of
a deterministic operation of the dia
lectic of ideas. Others have thought
of ideas as genes which impart to
history a particular kind of shape in
advance.
A more moderate view is that,
while ideas do serve to condition
history, ideas are themselves products
of human endeavor, at least in
the sense that they are received,
elaborated or modified and transmitted
to succeeding generations. Thus, while
ideas promote the development of a
culture, they are also influenced by
culture. While there are no 'pure
ideas'�ideas apart from minds which
hold them�neither is there 'pure his
tory.' As Whitehead says.
This notion of historians, of history devoid of
aesthetic prejudice, of history devoid of any
reliance upon metaphysical principles and cos-
mological generalizations, is a figment of
imagination.!
A careful analysis will reveal that
the number of assumptions basic to a
culture is fairly small, and that these
are frequently derived from one
master-generalization, which itself
serves to lend coherence to intellectual
1 Whitehead, Alfred North, Adventures of
Ideas. New York: Macmillan, 1933, p. 4.
life. In seeking to understand the
ideas which have been most power
fully dominant in the shaping of our
modern age, one must bear in mind
that the higher generalizations of a
period are likely to be implicit rather
than explicit. They are most frequent
ly expressed in terms of their
derivatives, these latter serving as a
'front' for the basic generalizations.
It should be remembered that the
vitality of an idea is not dependent
upon its truth or falsity. No one will
deny that the geocentric astronomy
was a powerful intellectual determin
ant in the Middle Ages, though it
later proved to be untenable. Perhaps
the most difficult task for any age is
that of realizing that its basic prin
ciples are in reality assumptions. The
dif&culty here rises from the apparent
tendency of minds to be dazzled by
ideas; or to put it another way, the
mentality of any period is subject to
self-hypnosis, with the result that
enthusiasm for fundamental principles
obscures the power of criticism so
that these principles are accepted as
absolute truths. Only here and there
can be found minds sufficiently frank
and objective to admit that they are
assumptions and subject to either
transformation or abandonment.
The thought world of the eighteenth
century, with its emphasis upon the
order of nature as com])rehended by
reason and as laying a foundation for
natural religion, was radically trans
formed in the nineteenth century.
The early romanticists, while accept
ing the majestic concept of order in
nature, gave to that concept a new
interpretation. During the last quar
ter of the eighteenth century, and the
first half of the nineteenth, there came
into the thinking of the western world
a growing interest in the idea of
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development, not now as a universal
process 'bearing all forward as on a
great wave, but as a temporal, and in
a sense local, forward movement in
which every existing thing has come
to its present state by pursuing its
own laws of development.
We should not imagine that Dar
win's Origin of the Species was the
chief factor in the transition from the
typical eighteenth century mentality
to that of our 'modern' period. In
point of fact, the works of Lessing,
Herder and Hegel in Germany, and
of the Encyclopedists and (later)
Cousin in France, had popularized the
conception of development until the
learned world was so conditioned as
to quickly accept the views of Darwin.
The effect of his work was, it seems,
to convince the scientific world that
whatever difficulties may be found in
proving the how of evolution, the
that of evolution is undeniable. For
eighty years, the generality of scien
tific men have held as a dogma, that
all forms of life have developed from
a few simple forms.
The application of the hypothesis of
evolution has been widespread and
fearless: the principle has been con
scripted to do service in the fields not
only of biology, but of stellar origins,
of psychology, of society and social
configurations, of morals, and of reli
gion. Underlying this manifold use is
a principle really more basic, or at
least more elemental, namely that of
oontinuitp. It is this generalization
which has conditioned the major part
of modern thought.
Implied in the principle of contin
uity is the rejection of all dualisms,
and particularly the rejection of the
dualism of natural and supernatural.
In place of this has been substituted
in modern thought the monistic view
of the world as externalizing one
cosmic principle. God, man, and
nature thus meet on common ground :
all are parts of a growing whole.
Within this scheme, the process of
development appeared to some as the
supreme expression of the divine life.
When the explanations offered by
Lamarck, Darwin, and De Vries were
successively weighed and found want
ing, at least two alternatives were
open to twentieth-century thinkers:
they might begin to question the
validity of the principle of continuity
itself; or they might continue to hold
the principle as truth, and seek some
other mode of explanation. That the
latter alternative has been generally
chosen few will deny. The charm of
the idea of continuity for the modern
mind has been great. Under its sway
one of the men considered to possess
a mind as keen as any in our genera
tion writes:
For example, at a remote period urged by the
growth of forests some mammals ascended trees
and became apes ; and then later, after the lapse
of some vast period, urged by the decay of for
ests, the same race descended from trees and
became men.2
This does not mean that the think
ers who dogmatically accept the
evolutionary hypothesis are content to
remain without a rationale for their
belief. The latest attempt at explana
tion is that known as 'creative' or
'emergent' evolution, a metaphysical
theory whose assumptions are quite
other than the empiricism of which
science boasts. Carl F. H. Henry
comments as follows:
Modern science first revolted against theistic
creationism because of its supposed "non-scientific"
character. But now science has reacted to the
inability of Darwinian evolution to produce miss
ing links, by the proclamation of a speculative
theory of reality whose pivot points are rooted
not in science but in philosophy.3
Perhaps sufficient has been said
concerning the power of the conception
of continuity in general to indicate
that it exercises a two-fold tyranny in
2 Whitehead: op. cit., p. 8.
3 Remaking the Modern Mind. Grand Rapids:
Eerdman's, 1946. p. 118.
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our modern day. It has so captured the
fancy of the scholarly world that no
paucity of evidence in its support can
bring the modern mind to treat it
skeptically- And, it has succeeded in
forcing its canons upon all branches
of scholarly investigation until it may
fairly be said to be the predominant
motif in the typically modern way of
thinking.
In few fields of scholarship has the
application of the generalization of
continuity been more fearlessly applied
than in the field of religion. It is not
the purpose of this editorial to trace
the implications of this principle for
the historic Christian doctrines of
creation, revelation, human nature,
and redemption, and for the Christian
eschatology. A little reflection will
reveal that the searching application
of the evolutionary hypothesis will
necessitate not only a radical trans
formation of the character of the
historic Christian system, but a denial
of its qualitative superiority over the
other religious systems of men.
It is significant that in this very
field in which the principle of con
tinuity has for nearly a century been
embraced with such enthusiasm, there
are indications of some searching of
heart. By the kind consent of Dr.
Robert H. Pfeiffer, editor of the Jour
nal of Biblioal Literature, we are
reprinting a book review, written by
Dr. Walther Eichrodt, Professor of
Old Testament in the University of
Basel. The editor of The Ashuri/ Sem
inarian is very grateful to his former
teacher for this permission, which
allows us to bring to our readers a
stimulating and scholarly expression
of the newer temper.
�H. B. K.
An Analysis of Harry Emerson Fosdick's
'A Guide to Understanding the Bible'*
Walther Eichrodt
Basel, Switzerland
Fosdick's book, A Chude to Under
standing the Bible, is clearly and
beautifully written. The author shows
good knowledge of modern biblical re
search, as well as ability to control the
wide material, from which he selects
what suits his purpose, presenting it
plastically and eloquently. He bases
his approach to the ethical and spir
itual values of the Bible almost wholly
on an evolutionary historicism ; his po
sition in the mid-current of modem
biblical scholarship without himself
being an original investigator, renders
his conclusions strikingly typical of
the school to which he belongs, reflect
ing the prevailing intellectual atmos
phere of the past generation in biblical
scholarship.
At the same time one cannot but be
aware that Fosdick's book reflects a
period of biblical scholarship which is
now drawing to an end, while a new
period is dawning. In his book the au
thor has, to speak candidly, written
the obituary of a whole scholarly ap
proach and method of investigation,
making both their inherent merits and
their limitations clear to the thought
ful student. While no trained scholar
of today would deny the great impor
tance of the evolutionary principle in
history, much less its value in clearing
up many seemingly enigmatic phenom-
?Reprinted from the JOURNAL OF BIB
LICAL LITERATURE, Vol. LXV, Part H,
June 1946, with the permission of the editor,
Robert H. Pfeiffer. This article is an abstract in
English, prepared by William F. Albright _ from
the German text, which is printed in full in the
periodical mentioned above, pp. 208 ff : Receipt of
tliis review was hindered by the war; the abstract
has been revised by the original reviewer.
ena of biblical literature, we are today
acutely conscious of the danger of as
suming unilinear evolution of institu
tions or ideas. Two dangers stand out
clearly; first that of reconstructing
history to suit hypotheses a priori of
the direction of development: second
that of identifying description of evo
lutionary historical stages with in
sight into the true meaning of these
successive stages.
Thus Fosdick adopts a fundamental
error of modern scholarly research in
making the evolution of the religion of
Israel begin with the most primitive
ideas and practices in order to point
a contrast between the alleged low
level of early Israel and the high level
evident in later books of the Old Tes
tament. Of course, one cannot deny
that there were early survivals from
still earlier stages of religious culture;
the great mistake is to construct a
svstem out of such survivals, arbitrar-
ily disregarding or rejecting all con
trary evidence for a higher level of
ethical and spiritual life and thought,
which is explained away or treated as
later interpolation in earlier sources.
Thus we have the familiar figure of
Yahweh as a purely anthromorphic
nature deity, limited to a single shrine
or tribe, brutal and sanguinary in
character, represented by a fetish or
image, pacified by human sacrifice. , , .
This extraordinary picture is con
structed only by eclectic selection of
passages which are interpreted in such
a way as to suggest the picture in ques
tion, disregarding the fact that the
oldest narrative sources, in particular
the Yahwist, as well as the earliest
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legal corpora, presuppose a much high
er level of ethics aud a much more
advanced faith in Grod. In this con
nection the author disregards entirely
the already published works of Gress-
man and Volz, where similar objec
tions to current criticism are stated.
Moreover, our knowledge of Israel
ite religious history is not really made
any easier by this schematizing re
construction; actually historical inter
pretation becomes harder than it was
originally. Modem scholars have
failed completely to show how this
alleged transformation of early Is
raelite religion to a pure monotheism
could have taken place and what basic
forces there were which could have
altered the picture of God so radically.
It is quite impossible to attribute all
this to the activity of the prophets,
since their activity itself presupposes
an established belief in God as judge,
redeemer and foreseeing planner of
Israel's future. The familiar pattern
of a nomadic stage followed by a peas
ant phase is totally inadequate, be
cause a specifically religious innova
tion cannot emerge from a change of
material status. Moreover, Canaanite
religious syncretism exerted more dis
integrative than constructive force, so
it cannot be held responsible for such
a radical change in the religion of Is
rael. \Vith insight far surpassing his
lesser contemporaries A^'ellhausen rec
ognized that no satisfactory explana
tion of this change can be given, while
Eduard Mever pointed out the futility
of the cliche which radical scholars
often employed in order to explain the
source of Israelite monotheism : "Yah
weh God of Israel and Israel people
of Yahweh."
The author also exaggerates the
social mission of the prophets, who
came primarily to proclaim the im
minence of divine judgment on a sinful
people, not to propagandize for a so
cial ideal. It is a strange misunder
standing of the prophetic point of view
to say with the author that God was
identified by the prophets with an uii-
attained social ideal. On the other
hand the author fails entirely to men
tion such fundamental matters as the
wrath and the stern severity of God,
which formed so large a part of the
prophetic message, presumably be
cause they do not seem to fit well into
the rising evolutionary curve from
primitive polytheism toward the con
cept of the God of love. The author
fails completely to reckon vrith the
fact that the prophets were closely
associated with the cultic life of Israel,
a relation clearly expressed in their
expectation of a new temple at the
same time that they continued to com
bat the old temple. Similarly, the
author does not even recognize, much
less explain, the same paradox in
Judaism, where preachers of a faith
with cosmic scope at the same time
attribute a special place to the holy
people and its temple. The underlying
reason for this lack of insight on the
part of the author is his neglect of the
covenant idea which is so character
istic of the conception of Israel's re
lationship to God in Old Testament
literature. Instead the author adopts
certain general religious ideas derived
from the individualistic spirit of
Hellenism as his guide through the
essentially different conceptual world
of the Bible. With such guidance it is
scarcely surprising that he stakes out
a short cut through the Bible which
consistently excludes not only Old
Testament cult but also New Testa
ment teachings about the Church, its
sacraments, its liturgy, and its ex
pectation to the return of Christ. Here
it becomes obvious that the choice of
the authors' factual data for his pur
pose is deteriuined by his subjective
premises rather than by any scientific
method.
The second outstanding danger in
dicated above is that mere description
of evolutionary stages is treated as
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equivalent to real understanding of
what is essential in any phenomenon
belonging to the history of the human
spirit. However, phenomena of this
order can be understood only when
their basic principles and intrinsic
forces through which they receive
their structure are known. For biblical
religion this means that one cannot
pass over the central concept, that
God bears a special relationship to
His people, a relationship appropri
ately designated by the words "coven
ant" and "election." Only when we
fully recognize the centrality of this
conviction in the faith of Israel do we
grasp the true inwardness of biblical
teachings^ which not only convey the
teaching of God but also bear witness
to the acts of God, through which
reality makes itself felt in history. In
this way we learn to see the world of
early Israel, the age of the Prophets,
and the period of post-exilic Judaism
in a new light, standing not only in
logical, but also in living, relationship
to the divine act of revelation in
Christ.
It is, of course, true that the Old
Testament becomes much less easy for
the modern mind to understand as
soon as we abandon certain widely
assumed premises of modem thought.
Nor can it be any longer subordinated
to the New Testament by the simple
method of drawing a line of evolution
over it to culminate in certain select
ed high points of the New Testament.
On the contrary, it demands careful
study of its own dialectic representa
tion of the process by which God re
veals himself to man. Only in this way
can the Old Testament receive due
recognition for what it claims to be�
normative to all believers in God. This
claim of the Old Testament� embod
ied in the Church's recognition of its
place in the canon of Scripture�
demands the most careful and serious
effort at real understanding on our
part.
The Day of March Has Come
James D. Robektson
"Wonder is the effect of ignorance,"
wrote Samuel Johnson,, that literary
dictator of an age of reason. By and
by when our knowledge is more com
plete, he opined, those phenomena
which now fill us with awe will lose
their spell over us, for wonder is but
a pause in the reasoning process. A
century after Johnson, Tennyson
plucked a flower from the crannied
wall, and addressed is thus:
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand
Little flower�but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all
I should know what God and man is.
The two points of view here ex
pressed epitomize from the beginning
man's fundamental attitudes both in
side and outside the Church toward
the inexplicables of life. In the
Church of our day they are more pro
nounced tlian ever. As the points of
the compass make toward the mag
netic poles, so men have gravitated
about these two positions � rational
ism and faith � between which, so far
as religion is concerned, there is a
great gulf fixed. Asbury's theological
tenets place her solidly at that pole
which is the very antipode of rational
ism. Not only is Asbury one of a
steadily diminishing number of sem
inaries that continue to emphasize a
transcendental faith, but in her stand
for the Wesleyan doctrine of entire
sanctification she is unique. In fact,
the spread of scriptural holiness is her
ruling passion. In a world and in a
Church enslaved by the god of reason
she is charged with a great mission,
one that will tax to the utmost her
intelligence, her courage, and her
grace. For her the day of defensive
warfare is over. For her the day of
march has come.
It is my intention to consider with
you the relative merits of two or three
modes of aggression� an aggression
that is to be directed against modern
religious paganism, whether it reside
at the top of Mt. Olympus itself or on
those broad plain� and green valleys
below, over which the Olympian gods
preside. Inasmuch as campaigns are
won not by any single strategy but by
a combination of strategies, mine is a
question of emphasis, not of elimina
tion.
I ask first, what are our chances of
success if we meet our opponents on
the cold, altitudinous plains of rea
son? Let it be said at the outset that
our doctrinal position has nothing to
fear from even the most painstaking
scrutiny on the part of men dominated;
by the modern scientific temper. This
temper requires that the seeker after
truth shall have scrupulous regard
for two maxims: (1) he shall be sure
of his facts and (2) he shall adopt
that theory of explanation which of
fers to him the fewest difficulties while
best explaining all the facts. With
these things in mind we should con
vince the open-minded investigator
that our theological tenets are at least
as sustainable in the light of reason as
are those of any other system of belief.
It should be remembered too, as Pro
fessor Compton observes, that one's
faith in a way of life may represent a
thoroughly scientific attitude even
though he may not be able to estal)lish
satisfactorily the correctness of his hy
pothesis. In our case faith is based
upon the assumption that the Biblical
standards of regeneration and entire
sanctification, as understood by John
132
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"S^'eslev, most adequately meet all our
needs.
It is true that the spirit of the age
is most hostile to a faith in the super
natural. For this reason believing
Christians have often seemed embar
rassed and apologetic. As though all
the mysteries of life were confined to
the pages of the Bible! Is it not pass
ing strange that some men of science
� and religion � can coast so easily
over the rough places of science� the
hills and the bogs and the gorges �
only to stumble conveniently upon The
Rock of Ages! AVhy is it only in the
church that the mysterious becomes
so very disconcerting? Do we forget
that in all the areas of natural science
there are deep mysteries that never
have been or never shall be cleared
away? Henry Drumniond of Edin
burgh is right when he says, "I find
so many more puzzling things outside
the Bible than in it." At the end of
his book. The Riddle of the Universe,
Ifaeckel writes, "We grant at once
that the innermost character of nature
is just as little understood by us as it
was by Anaximander and '^inpedocles,
2,400 years ago. We must even con
fess that the essence of substance be
comes more enigmatic the deeper we
probe into its heart." If science does
not blush for her inability to explain,
why should faith? We need then have
no misgivings over engaging in a con
test in which the strategy of logic is
dominant, for the reasonableness of
our theological position is tenable
enough, as far as reason goes. It re
mains for us to shed ourselves of those
complexes that dilute our testimony
and incapacitate us for strong and de
cisive action. It is to be borne in mind,
however, that in a logical disputation
we should expect to meet our oppo
nents on ground held sacred by them;
we should expect to use weapons
which they from long and continued
ex))erience brandish most expertly.
Be that as it may, it is in point to
make some brief inquiry into the value
of the appeal to reason so far as the
history of the Church is concerned.
(It goes without saying, of course,
that any religious appeal that is with
out intellectual foundation is worse
than useless.) I take an example from
the early Church. Stephen arraigned
before the Sanhedrin was accused of
doing great wonder-s and miracles
among the people, of teaching doc
trines calculated to work havoc with
the traditions of the Jews. A blas
phemer, they called him. You remem
ber Stephen's defense, in Acts 7. How
he drained himself of all his logic, of
all his art, of all his strength! He
spoke of Moses' disappointment with
the children of Israel for their failure
to recognize him as their deliverer
from Egyptian bondage, especially
after they had witnessed him avenge
one of their brethren at the hands of
an Egyptian. When Stephen added
that the Israelites "understood not"
these things, he put his finger upon
the tragic flaw in human nature�
spiritual blindness. Both Closes and
Stephen failed to get tlicir critics to
see the truth. Nor did the faultless
arguments of the chief of the apostles
avail anything in the f;ice of a Gibral
tar of religious scepticism. But Paul
had hoped for no more. His letter to
the Corinthians shows clearly his opin
ion of human reason as a mover of
men, "And I brethren, when I came
to you, came not with the excellency
of speech or of wisdom, declaring unto
you the testimony of God. . . . And I
was with you in weakness, and in fear,
and in much trembling. And my
speech and my preaching was not with
enticing words of man's wisdom, but
in demonstration of the Spirit and of
power." Luther, likewise, before red-
capped cardinals and purple-robed
bishops spent himself in a vain effort
to bring these princes of the Church
to a knowledge of the truth. He final
ly came to the end of himself, "Here
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stand I; I cannot do otherwise. God
help me! Amen." The German monli
had failed to establish his thesis be
fore his ecclesiastical superiors, but
he left the Diet of Worms to turn the
world upside down. Nor was it the
"sweet reasonableness" of his theology
tliat did it. Two centuries after Lu
ther the established church of England
refused to see the scriptural sound
ness of the new evangelicalism and
forced John Wesley to retire from its
active ministry. Yet who doubts the
part Wesley and his Methodists played
in lifting England out of paganism
and possibly saving her from the hor
rors of a French Revolution?
In The Catholic Church and Cur
rent Literature George N. Shuster
points out the subjective dangers at
tendant upon one's attempting to ra
tionalize his theological position.
Speaking of the final victory of ro
manticism over rationalism in the first
half of the nineteenth century he
writes, "There was also a Catholic ra
tionalism manifest in the habit of re
stating scholastic philosophy in terms
of intellectual science, and in those
tendencies to render doctrine 'con
formable with reason', which finally
developed into 'modernism'." Scholas
ticism by and large was to the ^liddle
Ages what rationalism is to the pres
ent period � its temper was, believe
what can be proved. It was not, as
Hurst tells us, the dialectics of the
scholastics that prepared the way for
the Protestant Reformation ; it was
the teachings and influence of that
spiritually-minded group for whom
the heart is the home of all true th o"!
ogy � the Christian mystics. Like
wise it was John Henry Newman, not
Thomas Aquinas, who brought con
verts into the Church of Rome.
All of this suggests that which ha^
long been a commonplace among our
prophets and poets : there is a logic
of the hf^prt that transcends the logic
of the mind. George Eliot, for exam
ple, all her life repudiated Christian
ity because it failed to satisfy her rea
son. In her closing days, how^ever, this
brilliant and understanding inter
preter of the human heart leaned
heavily upon the devotional lyrics of
the old monk Thomas a Kempis. It
was as though she was irresistibly im
pelled to yield to the wisdom of her
heart � she who at one time in
the character of Dinah Morris had
poured out the message of her soul, a
message which for the reader of Adam
B' de strikes all the chords of the heart
in a grand symphonic sweep, but one
which the mind of George Eliot wist
fully rejects.
In any case the doctrines for which
we stand are not theorems to be ex
plained. They are facts, communica
tions from God, to be accepted. One
may ingeniously mill out a psychology
of regeneration or sanctification but in
the end it will be a mere rationaliza
tion. For it is not within the province
of psychology, or any other science for
that matter, to pronounce on matters
of faith. The continued practice of
such reasoning on our part may serve
to promote a high degree of mental
fecundity, but it is entirely probable
that this accretion will correlate neg
atively with a corresponding degree
of spiritual barrenness. Is it not
man's insatiable urge to explain, man's
"headiness" in matters of religion,
that is responsible for the multiplied
sects and schisms in Christendom
today?
If our major appeal is to man the
reasoning creature we can expect to
fare no better than did the apostles
and prophets when they resorted to
this same procedure. Reason is, after
all, but a frictional and elusive instru
ment in getting at truth. "Some men,"
w^'ites Arnold Lunn, "expect to find
God lying at the end of a string of
syllogisms." An intelligent account of
our position we must be able to give.
Our concern has been with the efficacy
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of such an account.
But man not only thinks; he also
feels. Some psychologists are of the
opinion that emotion is the basis of
civilization. John Dewey, considered
by many to be our greatest educational
philosopher, says that we have lost
confidence in reason because we have
learned that man is chiefly a creature
of habit and emotion. We do know
that feeling is a prime mover of men,
that most people seem to calculate
after an emotional rather than a men
tal pattern. What are the possibilities
of a Christian aggression in which
ti-ue emotion plays a major r61e?
It is per-tinent to note here that
much criticism has been directed
against the modern church in connec
tion with this word "emotion." It
seems that we have either far too much
feeling in our religion or far too little.
The evangelicals are accused of being
surfeited with a facile and efferves
cent enthusiasm nauseating to the
modern temper; the liberals are
charged with being cold and lifeless.
I do not know which we sliould fear
the more� Wesleyan fervor reduced
to the level of mawkish, sentimental
effusions, or Wesleyan intellectualism
bristling with formal logic. Against
the rising tide of emotionalism among
the sects some of the moderns have re
acted in the extreme. In The Chal
lenge of Jsrael's Faith G. Ernest
Wright says, "The Father-son picture
is in continual danger of degenerating
into a mere sentimentality." As though
all the virtues of life are not always
in danger of degenerating into their
correlative evils!
It needs to be emphasized that this
same indictment of superficiality
against the more turbulent minorities
may well be preferred against Chris
tians generally today. For although
the ethics of a well-bred religionism
may not exhibit the provincialisms of
a crude evangelicalism, even a casual
glance at the contemporary scene
shows a religious sentimentality that
is widespread. It was Mark Twain
who quoted Charles Darwin's father
as saying that Christianity is a
feather-bed on which to catch falling
( hristians. Modern Christianity has
been expansive on the fatherhood and
love of God, who is all too frequently
represented as a great cosmic nurse
maid who helps people out in time of
trouble. A brief illustration has been
used to make the situation more poign
ant. At the foot of the Matterhorn
the traveler in the Alps one day
chances upon a delicate little forget-
me-not. He handles it affectionately,
for it speaks to him of the tenderness,
the gentleness of God. As he lifts his
gaze, however, to behold the jagged,
snow-covered peak lose itself in the
clouds some 15,000 feet above, he is
reminded of another aspect of God's
naiure, one almost lost sight of these
days. He remembers that God is
greater, sterner, and more awful than
a sentimental Christianity suggests.
Today we clutch at the forget-me-not ;
we have lost the high Alps in a fog.
Today our ears are tuned only to the
soft music of the flutes and the violins
in the great cosmic orchestra ; for us
the boom of the drums and the blare
of the trumpets has been silenced. We
have desperate need of returning to
ponder those attributes of Deity that
were a passion with men like Calvin
and Knox � the Sovereignty, the Jus
tice, and the Holiness of God. We
need a Luther or a Wesley to rescue
these words from their dead estate.
But however emotion has been debased
in the service of r-eligion, whatever the
brand of sentimentality, whether it be
of the loud, lachrymose variety or
something more sophisticated, we can
nevertheless not afford to blind our
selves to the validity of strong emo
tional appeal. Without it we are pow
erless to effect the good.
To learn something of the value of
this type of approach I again glance
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at the history of the Christian Church,
The student of Church history well
knows that no great movement toward
God ever took place except under men
who were more remarkable for their
spiritual fervor than for their unusual
intellectual gift. They were for the
most part men of the David Brainerd
type, Francis of Assissi and his kind
influenced their times quite out of
proportion to their mental strength.
Thomas of Spoleto heard Francis in
the year 1220 and expressed his amaze
ment at finding this plain spoken, un-
imposing preacher the admiration of
so many learned men. Two hundred
and sixty years later Savonarola be
gan preaching in Florence. His ser
mons, at first erudite, logical, and
polished, attracted little attention. It
was only when Savonarola abandoned
his love of intellectual display and
broke through all the traditions of the
pulpit that the crowds flocked to hear
him. Michelangelo, they say, could not
refrain from shedding tears at the re
membrance of these sermons. It is re
ported of John Wesley, "the best-dis
ciplined mind of the modern pulpit,"
that he brought to the Gospel the feel
ing that is most intense when it is
most repressed. Of Whitefield, "He
was something that burned men like
fire, that bent them like the wind, that
drove them like a wave of the sea." Of
Phillips Brooks, "He drove through
our veins like a bolt of lightning." S.
Parkes Cadman feels that Spurgeon's
provincialism and intolerable theolog
ical temper have been singled out for
just criticism, but at the same time he
is quick to state that for power and
persuasiveness Spurgeon had no equal.
Examples such as these could be mul
tiplied. It should sufiice to observe
that the men who moved people to
ward God were men of passion. But
what saith our Lord concerning this
matter of enthusiasm? There are
times when Christ is represented as
being vexed, and times when He is
shown as being angry. But only once
is He represented as being perfectly
nauseated, and that at the church of
the Laodiceans, a church proud of her
knowledge, and boasting a "deeper
than common insight into Divine
things." John the revelator records
the cause of the divine opprobrium : "I
know thy works, that thou art neither
cold nor hot; I would thou wert cold
or hot. So then because thou are luke
warm, and neither cold nor hot, I will
spue thee out of my mouth." So then
the record would indicate that if the
slain of the Lord are to be many we
must do more than proclaim the truth,
(An adding machine can do that.)
Evidently what counts is our enthus
iasm for the truth.
But man not only thinks and feels.
He also wills. It is not enough that
we convince men that they should ac
cept a certain pattern of conduct, not
enough that we arouse in men an ar
dent desire to pursue a course of ac
tion. Our mission will fail utterly
unless we see men embrace with all
their heai-t and mind and strength that
which we believe to be the Bible plan
of salvation. When Dewey asserts
that a philosophic faith can be tried
and tested only in action he is but at
testing to the scriptural formula for
establishing the validity of the Christ
way of life : "O taste and see that the
Lord is good." {Ps. 34:8) The man
born blind knew that he was healed
because something had ha])penGd to
him. The Jews could not gainsay his
testimony. Paul was forever talking
about his Damascus road experience.
It was his mightiest argument. Some
times there is more logic in a single
demonstration than in a volume of ar
gumentation. "Come and see," an
swered Philip to- Nathaniel's question,
"C an any good come out of Nazareth?"
"Come and see," urged the woman of
Samaria upon her curious neighbors.
"Reach hither thy finger and l>ehold
my hands, reach hither thy hand and
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thrust it into my side," spoke One to
a chronic doubter. It was ever thus!
We may dazzle man with Socratic wis
dom and move him with excruciating
pathos, but until man tastes and sees
for himself he will remain as Christ-
less as the untaught native in the high
lands of Tibet.
In contemplating a campaign for
the souls of men we shall by no means
ignore the claims of reason, although
we know that dependence upon this
factor alone is a questionable proce
dure; we shall remember to invest
heavily in the resources of emotion,
for truth freighted with feeling will
by God's grace bring men to the very
borders of Christian experience; but
having exhausted all our energies of
mind and heart we shall not for a mo
ment fail to proclaim with Job-like
tenacity that the faith we seek to
promulgate is to be "tried and tested
only in action."
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process of construction on the seminary campus. The cost of this building,
without furnishings, will be approximately one hundred seventy-five thousand
dollars. Every effort is being centered upon comi)leting this building by com
mencement, with the view that it must be completed by the opening of the
fall quarter in 1947.
Another significant event in the life of the seminary was consummated in
October. The Free Methodist Church has othcially designated Asbury Theo
logical Seminary as the seminary to wliich they will send their students spon
sored by the Wesley Foundation. A Wesley Foundation House will be estab
lished near the campus of the seminary for Free Methodist students, begin
ning with the fall quarter of 1947. The plan of cooperation between the Free
Methodist Church and the seminary extends over a period of three years.
The next outstanding event at the seminary will be the Minister's Confer
ence for 1947 which will be held February 25-27, Bishop Edwin Holt Hughes
and Dr, R, P. Shuler will each deliver five lectures at the conference. There
will also be daily class sessions in connection with the conference, and other
special features, ^lore than three hundred ministers were in attendence at the
1946 conference, coming from a territory extending from New York to Louisi
ana, The conference is open to laymen as well as ministers. Those who have
planned to attend the conference in February, should make reservation in
advance for entertainment by writing to Dr. W, D, Turkington, Asbury
Tlieological Seminary, Wilmore, Kentucky,
Hegelianism and Christianity
John H. Gerstner, Jr.
John Oman has written : . . We
are waiting today for some change in
philosophy away from Helegianism
and the process of thought as the key
to the universe, corresponding to the
movement of science away from New-
tonianism, with its assumption of the
laws of motion as the efficient cause
of things."^ This statement reveals
two things : first, that Hegel is still
with us, and, second, that men who
think as Oman thinks wish he were
not.
Hegel's influence has been greatly
under-rated precisely because his own
claims were so greatly over-stated.
Xever in the history of thought did
any man profess such exhaustive
knowledge and practical omniscience.
F. L. Patton, that master of verbal
caricature, states it this way : "When
Zopliar the Naamathite put the ques
tion to his class, 'Who by searching
can find out God?' an Hegelian, amid
the silence of the school, courageously
held up his hand."^ Again : "Here, as
a witty writer suggests, is a catasti o-
phe the reverse of that of Korah; the
earth has not swallowed up the man,
but the man has swallowed up the
universe."-' Unfortunately, though
Hegel explained everything no one is
sure he can explain Hegel. It seems
that a student brought a passage to
Hegel for explanation and the philos
opher replied : "When that passage
was written, there were two who knew
its meaning�God and myself. Xow,
alas! there is but one, and that is
1 Naturalism and Supernaturalism, (Macmillan.
1931), pp. 107-108.
2 Fundamental Christianity, (Macmillan, 1926),
p. 38.
3 Harris. Samuel The Self-Revelation of God,
(Scribners, 1887), p. 260.
God."
There was one thing more surpris
ing than the stupendousness of Hegel's
claim and that was that his contempor
aries believed it! But they did, and
following a period of philosophical
inebriation came the morning after
and then the revulsion from which, it
seems, philosophers are still suttering.
When this revulsion set in, the phi
losophers not only threw out Hegel's
baby with Hegel's wash, but they
threw out Hegel too. And it is proving
veiy difticult for him to get back again.
Hence, we hear much disparagement
and little appreciation. Xevertheless,
though Hegel's name may be anath
ema, many of his ideas, as Oman sug
gests, have become sacred.
Let us comment briefly on the
Hegelianism of two of the world's
outstanding philosophers, A. N.
Whitehead and John iJewey. Op
posed as each of these men is to tiie
Absolute Idealism of Hegel, they
nevertheless show striking alfinity for
his fundamental viewpoint. The
German philosopher was most char
acteristically dissatisfied with any
thing lurking behind phenomena.
Thus, he refuted the substance theory
of Spinoza, the thing-in-itself of Kant
and the absolute of Schelling. As
Weber has stated : "In Hegel, the
absolute is the process itself; it does
not produce movement and life, it is
movement and life.""^ For Whitehead
and Dewey also process is reality. In
the former's Process and Reality
existence and the natural order are
ultimate, and God, if anything, ap
pears to be its product, certainly not
4 Weber and Perry, History of Philosophy,
(Scribners, 1925), p. 406.
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its producer. Dewey's Quest for Cer
tainty is significant here. He deplores
the philosophical endeavor to find
abiding ideas and prefers to believe
in the world as flux or process. Thus
Dewey finds uncertainty, and Hegel a
kind of certainty, but the important
thing is that they look in the same
place. All of these philosophers find
nothing behind phenomena.
Hegel's influence is by no means
restricted to philosophical circles.
Rather, as Dr. Brightman says :
It speaks well for the power of reason today that
Hegel is still an influence in the world of affairs.
No Hegel, no Marx-Engels-Lenin ; no commun
ism and no socialist critique of communist dogma.
No Hegel, no Nazi theory of the state and no
Liebert to indict it. No Hegel, no Gentile to or
ganize the Fascist system of education and no
Croce to defy Mussolini. It is from Hegel that
Royce received much of his inspiration ; from
Hegel that Dewey took bis start, and to Hegel
he still looks as the greatest of the systematic
philosophers. 5
Nevertheless, our concern in this
paper is with Hegel's significance in
the realm of religion. Himself always
an avowed Lutheran, Hegel's philos
ophy of Christianity was Janus-faced.
His identification of the content of
religion and of philosophy could be
evaluated diversely. If one is im
pressed with the rational bulwark thus
provided for religion, as is Hocking,
the effect is conservative. If one is
impressed with the complete rational
izing of religion, the effect is radical.
Ahnost immediately after Hegel the
theologians chose up sides, forming
themselves into right and left wing
Hegelians.
Among the conservatives. Daub and
especially Biedermann are examples.
Daub could write that the sig-nificance
of ( hiist was that he exhibited the
eternal incarnation of God and re
demption of the world in his own
pei'son as a historical fact. Thus he
S In Wieman, H. N., and B. E. Meland, Amer
ican Philfl'snphii's of Religion, (Willett, Clark &
Co., 1936), p. 319.
was the God-man in a unique sense.^
Biedermann supplemented Hegel by
teaching that religious faith was a
distinct element not to be equated
with or dissolved by reason. But this
faith presupposes revelation which it
discerns immediately. H. R. Mac
intosh in Types of Modern Philosophy
describes Biedermann as the philos-
oi^her "who meant to be as Hegelian
as possible, but always found Christ
ianity breaking in.'"'
The radical wing found in Feuer-
bach and Strauss their ablest and
most devastating exponents. Feuer-
bach reduced the absolute to man's
size and ultimately, as a materialist,
rejected all ideas including those of
God which he called "Wunchwesen"
or wishful thinking. In Strauss's
Leben Jesu, the pictures of Hegel have
become the "myths'" of Christianity.
In iilaiih^ nsleJirc, religion in general
seems to lose its savor. Finally
Strauss asks himself, "Are we still
Christians?" and answers: "If we
would have our yea yea and our nay
nay, in short, if we would speak as
honest, upright men, we must acknowl
edge that we are no longer Christ
ians."^ Pfleiderer points out Strauss'
significance in the histoiy of Hegel
ianism.
Two previous works upon Immortality, the au
thors of which are Richter and Feuerbach, were
reckoned among the Hegelian school, had indeed,
by the radical negative conclusions therein
reached by the application of this philosophy,
shaken the confidence generally felt in Hegelian
orthodoxy; but . . . produced no very important
effect. When, however, Strauss brouglit the
heavy artillery of his criticism, distinguished
equally by learning and penetration, to bear, first,
on the historical foundations of the dogma itself
the unsubstantial fabric of Hegelian dogmatism
was within a few years completely destroyed.9
6 Pfleiderer, Otto, The Development of Theol
ogy, (Macmillan, 1890), p. 132.
7 H. R. Macintosh, Types of Modern Philos-
ohpy. p. 133.
8 Quoted in Smith, H. B., Faith and Philosophy,
(Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1877), p. 469.
9 The Development of Theology. (Macmillan,
1890), p. 132.
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In England Hegelianism prevailed
in a pure form at Oxford, but was
gradually watered down. In the class
room, Dr, Brightman once gave his
rating of some of the British thinkers
and this is the score if my notes do
not fail me: Bradley and Bosanquet,
100% Hegelian ; Pringle-Pattison,
60%; Sorley, 40%; Ward, 0%. Dr,
Ralph Barton Perry, rather more glee
ful than sad, has a similar story to
tell:
Thus the weakness of Hegel, from the later
idealistic point of view, lies not in his general
programme, but in the fact that he boldly set
about carrying it out. He made too many pos
itive assertions. The fact that Hegel did make
positive assertions about natural evolution, about
historical development, and about international
politics, accounts for the fact that his philosophy
was of vital consequence, and to many a source
of inspiration. But today no one is more ready
than the idealist to point out that Hegel made
the mistake of forcing 'psychological' categories
upon nature and history. He tried to deduce the
actual cosmic process from the laws of spirit;
and it is now generally conceded that he failed.
Everyone but the idealist explains his failure by
the falsity of the project itself; but he attributes
it to the fact that Hegel's categories of spin;
were not purely logicalA^
Josiah Royce, George H, Howison
and William E. Hocking stand as
American exponents of modified
Hegelianism. Royce turned his atten
tion especially to the problem of the
individual and evil, while Howison
objected that Royce had not allowed
sufficient place for the individual self
and contended for a plurality of
selves. The place of feeling in Objec
tive Idealism is a particular concern
of Hocking.
However, the most significant mod
ern role of Hegelian religion is as
thesis to Kierkegaard's antithesis.
Hegel's was the original "both-and"
against which Kierkegaard thrust his
"either-or." When Hegel was con
fronted with what appeared to be
contradictions he attempted, as we
10 Present Philosophical Tendencies, (Long
man's, Green & Co., 1925), p. 177.
shall see, to overcome them by his
famous dialectical method�thesis and
antithesis taken up into {aufgehohen)
a higher synthesis. Kierkegaard was
the policeman who, as soon as he saw
the philosophical machine begin to
grind its gears, blew his whistle,
"Stop !" He was the champion of the
unresolved contradiction. For Hegel
religion was whole thought; for Kier
kegaard it was shattered thought.
Hegel relied on rationality; Kierke
gaard cast himself upon the irrational.
Hegel deified the intellect ; Kierke
gaard crucified it. For Hegel religion
was a steady climb; for Kierkegaard
it was a frantic leap.^^
For all Kierkegaard's earnestness,
we doubt that he ever truly liberated
himself from rationalism. As John
Wild has pointed out.^^ Kierkegaard
asserts the good is unknowable and
paradoxical. But this is belied by
two things : first, he makes no appeal
to anything other than reason. Sec
ond, his three stages imply that man
naturally comes to a knowledge of the
good.
The spiritual seed of Kierkegaard,
Earth and Brunner, show the same
overt opposition to Hegel and the
"System." Earth's anathemas are in
no sense restricted to Hegel, since, as
be says, whatever is Christian is not
philosophical and whatever is philo
sophical is not Christian. His com
plete abhorrence of imnianentism and
utter devotion to the "absolutely
Other," is hostile indeed to Hegel's
God, who is in a very entangling
alliance with this woild and is the
absolutely-not-Other,"
Erunner's opposition to Hegel is
rather more reasoned, which fact ac
counts for Earth's distrust of it.
Fii'st, Brunner estimates Hegel's in
fluence :
11 Cf. esp. Philosophical Fragments, and Con
cluding Scientific Postscript.
12 "Philosophical Review," Vol. XLIX, No. 5,
Sept. 1940, p. 544.
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Since the time of Herder, Hegel, and Schleier-
macher this scheme of a universal spiritual evo
lution, including also the Christian religion, has
become a sort of scientific axiom which anyone
who claims to be systematic must simply accept.
This thesis of idealism has been rendered un
objectionable to theology by the circumstance
that the conception of the individuality of
religions seemed to give due place to the peculiar
character of the Christian faith.l3
Then, he criticizes Hegel's position
fundamentally: "The decisive differ
ence, therefore, consists in the fact
that, for the idealist, the self-disclos
ure [of God] is fundamentally imme
diate, whereas for the Christian faith
it is fundamentally mediated."^"^
We pass now from a consideration
of Hegel's influence to date, back to
Hegel himself and especially his
philosophy of religion. The Alpha and
the Omega of Hegel's system is the
inclusiveness of the Absolute. Conse
quently his most frequently quoted
statement, "Das Wahre ist das Gauze"
is eminently characteristic of his
thought. Being and all other categor
ies are to be regarded as constituting
the Absolute. In the Science of
Logic, this view is set forth as the only
adequate one, all other ones being
inherently defective. Hegel's use of
the term "Inbegriff" is significant.
The "Inbegriff aller realitat" is the
sum total of all reality and the all-
inclusive Begriff or concept. It is not
only a sum but a new entity, the whole
being more than the sum of its parts.^''
Hegel's universal is no mere abstrac
tion, because an abstraction is drawn
off from and excludes reality; but
Hegel's universal is concrete, includ
ing reality. Bosanquet devotes Lec
ture II of his Principle of Individual-
it if and Value to the explication of this
concept.
Because of the all-inclusive charac-
13 Brunner, Emil, Philosophy of Religion, trans.
by Farrer & Woolf, (Scribners, 1937), p. 128.
I* Ibid., p. 40.
Encyclopaedic, �75.
16 Vol. n, p. 456.
^7 Ibid., p. 343.
ter of the Absolute, Hegelians hesitate
to use the word "person." F. H. Brad
ley, for example, uses the designation
super-personal. Adherents of the Per-
sonalist School may regard Hegel's
Absolute as including not one, but
many persons, and feel that the Hegel
ian super-person though he may be
more than, is not other than person.
It is interesting to note, in passing,
that C. S. Lewis thinks of God as
"beyond personality" and that Calvin
himself was almost tried for heresy
because he did not like the term
"persona" as descriptive of deity.
However, any similarity between the
latter's and Hegel's view of the Ab
solute are purely coincidental.
Since the Absolute includes all
things, it follows that all things re
veal the Absolute. Since all things are
revelations of the Absolute, the Ab
solute can be known. Since all things
constitute the Absolute and there is
nothing more, the Absolute may be
absolutely known. Hegel, in other
words, is champion of the knowability
of the Absolute and opponent of even
partial inscrutability. This is not
merely the logical conclusion of the
/'henonieiiologg and Science of Logic,
but the prelude to hiw Philosophy^ of
Religion.
Let us observe this further before
commenting. The Absolute unfolds
itselt in the realm of concepts (cf.
Science of Logic and in the realm of
nature (cf. Encyclopedia, ��245 ff.)
but onlv in the realm of mind, or
spirit does the Absolute come to con
sciousness and freedom (cf. Encnfclo-
pedia, ��482ff.; esp. 553ff.).
The Absolute unfolds itself in triadic
form also in the realm of spirit; first
in art, then in religion, and supremely
in philosophy. In art it appears in the
form of sense objects which, although
necessary for art, are an impediment
to a purely rational perception by
spirit. A more refined manifestation
is found in the representations (Vor-
stellungen) of religion which are
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picture-tlioughts partaking of tlie sen
suous because they are pictures and of
tlie rational because they are thoughts.
In philosophy the Absolute is seen
immediately as pure thought.
This brings us to grii)s with Hegel's
doctrine of revelation. Manifestly, his
gnosticism was a great improvement
over the agnosticism of Kant and
Schelling. AV^e agree with jMaier in his
Hegel's Criticism of Kant in which he
shows that Hegel exposed the absurd
ity of Kant's talking about an object
which could not be brought in relation
to our consciousness. Kant's myster
ious underlying reality, having no
known qualities nt all, could not be
anvthing other than mind itself. This
Hegel argued and then proceeded to
conceive of mind as all that has being
and thereby made reality knowable by
itself. Likewise, he indicates the
futility of Sclielling's undifferentiated
Absolute, the hidden reality that in
cludes everything but in such abyssmal
darkness that nothing can be seen,
"the night in which all cows are
black." ^lure has pointed out that in
his intellectual optimism, Hegel is re
verting to the Greeks and away from
Kant's revolution by which, as Perry
says, the latter succeeded in "internal
izing reason." Hegel thought of Plato
and Aristotle as fundamentally the
same and with them agreed that what
is most real is eo ipso, that which is
most intelligible. The philosopher's
task, as Hegel saw it, was to prove
this.
In this respect, we need Hegel today.
To the liberals who despair of all cer
tainty and are profoundly skeptical of
the demonstrableuess of truth he
would say, "In the mental or spiritual
there is now an infinite . . . capable of
being communicated,"^* or, "the humil
ity which affirms that the finite cannot
know (lod nor come into direct rela
tion to him, simply ascribes to God
p. 355.
powerlessness to make himself
known. "^^ To the neo-orthodox, not
resigned to but revelling in the irra
tional, he would say: "Things do not
agree with ideas because you are on a
level of thought where you cannot
take all things into account. And
to the positivists and other secularists
of our day, he would say : "What
knowledge is v/ortli knowing if God be
unknowable ?"^^
There are two serious defects in
Hegel's teaching concerning revelation.
He makes too little of the apparatus
for receiving the revelation and too
much of general revelation itself. Even
Pfleiderer admits that Hegel's sole
reliance on thought as the recipient of
the revelation is unwarranted. "Reli
gion is essentially a matter of the
heart. "^^ This criticism has been so
generally made that it has become a
cliche to classify Hegel as one who
exaggerated the intellectual element
in religion, alongside Kant who did
the same with the volitional element
and Schliermacher with the emotional.
need not elaborate.
While it is conceded that Hegel
made too little of the apparatus for
receiving revelation, it has not been
especially noted that he made too
19 Philosophie d.er Religion, Vol. 1, p. 195,
quoted in Harris, Self-Revelation of God, p. 91.
20 Science of Logic, Vol. H, p. 397.
21 Philosophie der Religion, Vol. I, p. 27.
22 Development of Theology, p. 73. Cf . Strong,
Systematic Theology, p. 120. "Religion is not, as
Hegel declared, a kind of knowing for it would
then be only an incomplete form of knowledge,
and the measure of knowledge in such case would
be the measure of piety. . . . God is the subject
of religion as well as its object. Religion is God's
knowing of himself through the human con
sciousness. Hegel did not utterly ignore other
elements in religion. 'Feeling, intuition, and
faith belong to it,' he says, 'and mere cognition
is one-sided.' . . . 'what knowledge is worth
knowing, if God is unknowable.' ... he gave even
less place to the will than he gave to the emotions
and he failed to see that the knowledge of God
of which the Scripture speaks is a knowing, not
of the intellect alone, but of the \vhole man."
HEGELIANISM AND CHRISTIANITY 143
much of general revelation. It would
appear obvious that Hegel has oblit
erated the distinction between general
and special revelation. If all things
reveal the Absolute, because they are
the Absolute, there can be no such
thing as special revelation. What con
fuses the matter is that Hegel refers
to Christianity as absolute religion
and calls it "revealed."'^ Dr. Strong is
correct when he states that: "Hegel,
in his Philosophy of Religion, says
that Christianity is the only revealed
religion, because the Christian God is
the only one from whom a revelation
can come."^'^ Nevertheless, it should
be noted that this is quibbling with
terminology. True, Hegel believed
that the Christian conception of God
was the only adequate, viz., absolute,
one. And only the Absolute could re
veal the Absolute. And so the Chris
tian God is the only one from whom
revelation could come. But that is not
the equivalent of saying that Chris
tians were the only ones to whom it
came or Christianity the only religion
in ii hich it came, which is the historic
teaching of the Church.
The writer was once asked to
demonstrate the fact that the church
has maintained the views here in
dicated of special revelation. We
referred the questioner to Schaff's
three volume Creeds of Christendom
where anyone who runs may yet read
that the churches have uniformly tes
tified to a unique once-for-all revela
tion in no sense to be confused with
that natural revelation which is called
"common" precisely because it is
universal and at all times present.
Let me give but one citation at ran
dom. In the Westminster Confession
of Faith, for example, we read :
Although the light of nature, and the works of
creation and providence, do so far manifest the
goodness, wisdom, and power of God, as to
leave men inexcusable; yet they are not sufficient
2i Philosophy of Religion. Vol. II, pp. 329-330.
24 Systematic Theology, p. 27.
to give that knowledge of God and of his will,
which is necessary unto salvation; therefore it
pleased the Lord ... to reveal himself, and to
declare ... his will unto his Church.
In orthodox thinking special revela
tion is unique, once for all revelation.
It occurred at one time and one place
and to one people and is no general
world phenomenon at all. The late Dr.
Machen, who is regarded by Wieman
and Meland,^^ as the outstanding rep
resentative of traditional supernatur
alism, stresses the strict historicalness
of Christianity:
Christianity depends, not upon a complex of ideas,
but upon the narration of an event. Without that
event, the world, in the Christian view, is al
together dark, and humanity is lost under sin.
There can be no salvation by the discovering of
eternal truth. ... A new face has been put upon
life by the blessed thing that God did when he
offered up His only begotten Son.26
Brunner also, one of the ablest expon
ents of neo-supernaturalism, sees
through the spuriousness of Hegel's
"special revelation," contrasting it
with the Christian view:
To him the idealist history is merely a picture-
book, whose text he knows without the aid of
pictures ; to him it means the idea made concrete,
hence there is nothing decisive about it. In its
absolute and serious sense, there is no room here
for the category of uniqueness. . . . Hegel seemed
able to absorb history into thought as Plotinus
and Schelling did with Nature.27
Oman, likewise, is not deceived:
Though Hegel's idea that in history we see in the
furnace what is now built into life as cold and
commonplace, was a great contribution to the
whole method of studying history, in the end real
history has no place in his intellectual construc
tion. What masquerades as history is a show
staged by dialectic, not history as a record of
man's slow, laborious, often mistaken, constantly
discouraged, learning from experience by the
real hazard of dealing with environment.28
We return to Hegel's exposition. On
2i American Philosophies of Religion, p. 62.
26 Christianity and Liberalism, p. 70.
27 The Mediator, trans, by Olive Wyon, (Lut
terworth Press, 1934), pp. 36-37.
'2^ Naturalism and Supernaturalism, (Macmil
lan, 1931), p. 291.
144 JOHN H. GERSTNER, JR.
the level of religion, the dialectic, of
course, moves through three stages.
The thetic stage is that of the univer
sal. God is the universal mind. When
this universal mind, which cannot
remain in this splendid isolation, sun
ders itself into particularity the anti
thetic stage is reached. This moment
corresponds to the various positive
religions. As a result of the union of
the universal and particular moments
the synthesis is achieved and we have
what corresponds to the absolute
religion.
In Christianity, with which we are
primarily concerned, God is concrete
spirit the first moment of which is
God as He is before creation, the
second is God in creation, and the
third is God in the Church. In the
first, God, as the universal in itself, is
the Father. In the second, God, as
particular, is the Son. In the third,
God, as individual, is the Holy
Spirit.29
The pure heresy of such a view of
the doctrine of the trinity is self-
evident to anyone versed in the Bib
lical doctrine. Rather than submit my
own criticism I will cite McTaggart
whose testimony on this point
is especially significant insofar as
his concern in comparing Hegelian
Trinitarianism and Christian Trin-
itarianism is purely academic, since
apparently he is not devoted to either
conception himself. As something of
a neutral observer, he regards Hegel's
Trinitarianism as missing the mark of
ecclesiastical Trinitarianism.
According to Hegel's exposition, the Father
and the Son are the Thesis and Antithesis of a
triad of which the Holy Ghost is the Synthesis.
It will follow from this that the Holy Ghost is
the sole reality of the Trinity. Insofar as the
Father and the Son are real, they are taken as
correlative with the Holy Ghost, and as on the
same level with the latter, they are taken wrongly
and are not real. In other words, the Father and
the Son are simply abstractions which the thinker
29 Cf. Hegel, Philosdphy of Religion, Vol. Ill,
pp. 1,2.
makes from the concrete reality of the Holy
Ghost.
This may be the correct doctrine of the Trin
ity, but it is not the usual one. It must be noticed
that it does not merely place the Holy Ghost
above the other two members of the Trinity,
but merges these latter in the Holy Ghost, which
is therefore not only the supreme reality, but
the sole reality God. And, again, the doctrine is
more than the assertion that the relation of the
members of the Trinity is not merely external.
Doubtless it is not merely external, but internal
and essential. But the point is as to the particular
sort of relation. The Father and the Son are
related to the Holy Ghost as something which
is they, and more than they. But the Holy Ghost
is related to the Father and the Son�if it is to
be called a relation�in a very different manner.
Each of them, so far as it is real at all, is the
Holy Ghost. But each of them is less than the
Holy Ghost. And so are both of them taken
together.30
McTaggart might have said that
Hegel's doctrine was the procession of
the Father and the Son from the Holy
Spirit. Mackintosh does say : "This is
certainly a piece of heterodoxy ;
possibly an inversion of Church teach-
ing."^^
We have dealt with "God in His
eternal Idea in-and-for-self ; the King
dom of the Father." This phase of
Christian revelation Hegel associated
with the First member of the Trinity
and reserved for consideration the
other two members under the titles :
''The eternal Idea of God in the
element of consciousness and ordinary
thought, or difference; the kingdom of
the Son;" and "The Idea in the
element of the Church or Spiritual
(Community ; the kingdom of the
Spirit." It is with the latter two
divisions of the discussion that we are
now concerned.
Much in the manner of John's
statement that "no man hath seen God
at any time; the only begotten Son,
who is in the bosom of the Father, he
hath declared him" ; Hegel says : "this
Idea is now to be considered as it
^0 Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, (University
Press, 1901), pp. 203, 204.
31 Hegel and Hegelianism, (T. & T. Clark,
1903), p. 259.
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appears in the second element, in the
element of manifestation in general."^^
\Vhat was latent in the universal,
namely differentiation, now becomes
patent in the particular. Before, dif
ferentiation was "merely a movement,
a playing of love with itself, in which
it does not get to be otherness or
Other-Being in any serious sense,
nor actually reach a condition of
separation and division.^^ Now, dif-
derentiation has become entire other
ness: external, independent, alienated,
diiierent. Nevertheless, we are re
minded that the separation or differ
entiation is still not yet complete.
"What we have here is merely abstract
difference in general, we have not yet
got to ditference in the form which
peculiarly belongs to it."'''^
The Notion, which we have already
seen consists of three moments, now
passes into nature. "The absolute
freedom of the Idea means that in
determining itself, in the act of judg
ment, or ditferentiation, it grants the
iree independent existence of the
Other. This Other, as something thus
allowed to have an independent exist
ence, is represented by the AVorld
taken in a general sense."^^ This
transition is one of logical necessity
and is not to be confused with a tem-
l)oral order although the term creation
is used. Setli maintains that Hegel
does not bridge the gap here between
the logically necessary and the tem
porally generated otherness. And
alienation is the result of otherness.
Xevei'theless, alienation is not fully
manifested until nmn appears, for, as
I'tleiderer remarks,
. . . the difference is not fully developed in
nature, which remains true to its own essence and
character, faithfully obeys its own laws, and does
not step outside of the substance, the necessity of
its being. Man, on the contrary, is called to be
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol.
Ill, p. 34.
33 Ibid., p. 35.
34 Ibid., p. 35.
35 Ibid., p. 36.
or rather to become what he is essentially; it be
longs to the notion of him that he should place
himself over-against his nature, his present state,
and enter into the division between his essence
and his actual state. And his consciousness is it
self the act by which this division is set up, for
consciousness is the distinguishing of him, this
particular subject, from himself, his universal
being.36
Thus Hegel has a doctrine of the
fall but it is not the fall of man but
the fall of God. That is to say, God
by becoming finite or other, alienates
Himself from Himself. This differ
entiated and finite self Hegel speaks
of as man and thinks of him by virtue
of his finitude and otherness as fallen,
as evil.
Man is by nature evil ; his potential Being, his
natural Being, is evil. It is just in this his con
dition as one of natural Being that his defect is
found ; because he is Spirit he is separated from
his natural Being, and is disunion. One-sidedness
is directly involved in this natural condition.
VvIkh man is only as he is according to Nature,
he is evil. 37
It would appear that "man" was born
falhm. I'^vil is not something alien to
his nature but of the essence. He was
born in sin and in iniquity did his God
conceive him. Because he was a free,
independent, particulai- being, he was
a fallen being. It was not because he
misused his freedom but because he
used it ; not because he violated his
nature but because he expressed it,
that he was a fallen creature. When
Hegel's God rested from His creative
activity He saw everything that he
had made, including man, and, behold,
it was very bad.
This account of the Hegelian con
ception of evil is thus far one-sided
and inadequate. First of all, Hegel
conceives of an original state of
naturalness, a somewhat non-moral
state; and secondly, man even in his
fallen state is, in a sense, good as well
as evil. This is what provokes William
James' protest that Hegel "encour-
36 The Philosophy of Religion, Vol. II, p. 105.
37 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol.
Ill, pp. 47, 48.
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aged men to see the world good rather
than to make it good."
This doctrine of evil proceeding
from the Absolute Spirit implies that
God himself includes evil. We have
here the reverse of Christian Science
reasoning. Mrs. Eddy argues: God is
all, God is good, therefore, all is good.
Hegel argues : God is all, all includes
evil, therefore, God is evil. Of course,
this conclusion is a logical one on
a pantheistic presupposition. If the
Absolute is all-inclusive, as Hegel be
lieved, it must include evil. Consist
ent as the conclusion may be, it is, as
Mill believed, the reduction ah-
surdissimum/'
To say that man is by nature good
amounts substantially to saying that
he is potentially Spirit, rationality,
that he has been created in the image
of God; God is the Good, and Man as
Spirit is the reflection of God, he is
the Good potentially.^^ With this qual
ification in mind, we may state again
that nmn although good in one regard,
yet is alienated from God by nature.
This condition of separation, however,
sets up a longing, a feeling in which
a tendency to reunion is generated.
"In this division independence is set
up, and evil has its seat ; here is the
source of evil, but also the point from
which atonement ultimately arises. It
is both the beginning of sickness and
the source of health.'*�
Separation produces sin and sin a
desire for reconciliation. As the prod
igal son became dissatisfied with his
loneliness and his swine's fare and
longed for the father's house where
there was plenty and to spare, so the
particular in the state of separation
requires reunion with the universal.
38 Cf. Evcyclopaedie. �573; Mansel, Limits of
Rclig'.ous Thought, 3rd Edition, p, 46; and
Brightman, The Problem of God, (Abingdon
Press, 1930), p. 83.
39 Hegel, Lectures on Philosophy of Religion,
Vol. ni, p. 46.
40 Pfleiderer, The Philosophy of Religion, Vol.
n. p. 106.
This desire is the tendency toward
reconciliation which is as much in the
nature of things as is the separation.
Finite minds are restless till they find
rest in the infinite mind. This recon
ciliation is realized when the infinite
assumes finiteness. This logically
necessary, eternally recurr-ing move
ment of the infinite to the finite finds
doctrinal expression in the Incarna
tion and Death of Jesus Christ.
It is a proof of infinite love that God identified
Himself with what was foreign to His nature
in order to slay it. This is tiie signification of the
death of Christ. Christ has borne the sins of the
world. He has reconciled God to us, as it is
said.4i
The movement back from the finite
to the infinite is expressed doctrinally
in the Resurrection and in the Ascen
sion of Christ. God assumes finite
nature even to the extreme point of the
death of the infinite. This death, how
ever, is swallowed up in infinity as
God rises from death and ascends
again. "This death is thus at once
finitude and in its most extreme form,
and at the same time the abolition and
absoiption of the natural finitude."'*^
By His Ascension to the right hand of
God, Christ, says Hegel, demonstrates
the dignity, worth, and identity of
human nature with that of the divine
nature.
We have arrived at the stage where
the re-union has been effected. God
and Man are one again. They had
been one from the beginning but their
diversity had been implicit. Now, after
having affirmed most emphatically.
and even tragically, their diversity
they re-affirm their unity, not in spite
of diversity but because of it.
The Spirit of God is in ]\lan but not
in the individual man. Rather His
presence is where two or more are
gathered together in the Community
or Church. On the disciples the Holy
41 Hegel, Lectures oit the Philosophy of Re
ligion, Vol. Ill, p. 93.
42/^7td., p. 93.
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Ghost descended at Pentecost and be
came their immanent life. Real and
present life in the Spirit of Christ,
that is Hegel's definition of the
Church.
In the Spiritual Community as actually existing,
the Church is emphatically the institution in
virtue of which the persons composing it reach
the truth end appropriate it for themselves, and
through it the Holy Spirit comes to be in them as
real, actual, and present, and has its abode in
them; it means that the truth is in them, and
that they are in a condition to enjoy and give
active expression to the truth or Spirit, that they
as individuals are those who give active expres
sion to the Spirit.43
For Hegel, the Church is a "think
ing as well as loving and practical
communion. It thinks the contents of
the gospel narratives and of the Chris
tian sentiment in the form of the
Faith,"'^'^ Hegel's anti-Pietism is never
seen more clearly or more usefully at
work than in his insistence that
"dogma is necessary, and must be
taught as valid truth." It is not suffi
cient that the Community feel, it must
also think. When the Son of Man
comes again, will He find knowledge?
Hegel asks.
Proper appreciation of the import
ance of the sacraments is evident to
Hegel. If he was not a Romanist,
neither was he a sectarian.
The Eucharist is the central point of the doctrine
of Christianity, and the highest act of worship.
While, on the one hand, the constant preservation
of the Church ... is the continued repetition of
the life, passion, and resurrection of Christ in
the members of the Church, this, on the other
hand, is expressly accomplished in the sacra
ments of the Lord's Supper.
Thus he holds the Lutheran rather
than the Catholic or Zwinglian view.
We will ask one final question of
this Hegelian exposition of Christian
ity. HoA\' does it compare with the
^Ubid., p. 124.
44 Sterrett, J. MacBride, Studies in Hegel's
Philosophy of Religion, p. 297.
Church's exposition as embodied in
the historic Church creeds? In spite
of many points of some similarity be
tween the Christian and Hegelian doc
trine, I fear that the differences are
fundamental and radical. Hegel may
be correct but I doubt if it can be
maintained with any seriousness that
he is orthodox. His view of revelation
we have already sufficiently criticized.
Certainly his conception of the Trinity
is not that of the Church which be
lieves in a single substantial identity,
God, in which single substance there
are three Persons. The Hegelian Trin
ity is at most a ghost of this. In the
Hegelian deity the world is implicit,
or at least the idea of an other is
implicit. The Church would question
first whether this otherness is a con
crete world at all; second, it would
deny that if it were a world it emanat
ed necessarily from the nature of God;
and, third, the Church affirms that
this "other" is not the world but the
Soil of God.
Again, according to the church, God
saw His world that is was good, not
evil. Hegel's identification of finitude
and evil is a distinctly pagan concep
tion that, so far as I know, has never
found expression in a creed of any
orthodox Christian Church. Hegel's
insistence that the world, including
man, is in a sense good does not offset
the radicalness of his departure from
the church at this point.
Lastly, if the Church and the Bible
be not in error then Christ came into
the Avorld to save sinners and not to
merge finitude in the infinite. Since
Hegel's conception of sin is different
from that of the Church, it follows
that his notion of grace and associated
doctrines must be diverge, Christ
came not to call the finite to repent
ance but sinners; not to preach a
metaplwsical reconciliation but an
ethical one; not to make man into
God, but like unto God,
J. Harold Geeenlee
The motto of Asbury Theological Seminary, "The Whole Bible for the Whole
World," has today an increasing significance. It is not that any increase of
obligation to "the whole world" has recently been laid upon the shoulders of
us who claim an evangelical faith in the Lord Jesus Christ ; it is rather that
international events are demonstratiag with awful and increasing clarity that
the world's alternatives are "Christ or chaos." Furthermore, the remotest
corner of the earth is now but a few hours away from us ; and we are surely
without excuse if we rest content witb a life service which means anything
less than "the whole Bible for the whole world."
We rejoice, therefore, in the recognition that through the years Asbury
Theological Seminary and her alumni have had the vision of a responsibility
which extended even to the remotest regions of earth. Yet there is a more
immediate part of "the whole world,' and one before which we and our fel
low evangelicals have too long tacitly acknowledged our helplessness. This is
the increasing number, especially of younger people, who have become confused
by the assumptions of a naturalistic philosophy and have come to believe that
enlightened intellectuality and vital Christianity stand in irreconcilable oppo
sition to one another, and that naivete and obscurantism are necessary constit
uents of a vital faith in Christ as Savior and Lord.
To the tremendous task of meeting these challenges our seminary has set
itself; and we who are her alumni are inescapably bound up with her in re
sponsibility. Our prayers and gifts are needed, but also our own informed
personal interest must be manifested. We believe that the administration is
properly fulfilling the seminary's responsibility to the world in its enlarged
program for training men and women in sound intellectual scholarship com
bined with consecrated evangelism. Let us give our full support, and we shall
share its benefits. Let us to that end uaite our efforts with our fellow alumni
through our Alumni Association, that we and our seminary may mutually be
aided in meeting our responsibility to the world.
One of the ways in which we can keep ourselves informed concerning the
progress of Asbury Seminary is to take advantage of Alumni Day every Com
mencement. In 1947, Alumni Day is Saturday, May 31. We are fortunate in
having secured President Clyde Meredith of Taylor University as the Alumni
Day speaker. Let us make it a reunion day for every graduating class ! As
bury Seminary has without doubt been raised up "for such a time as this";
let us, her alumni, "rise up and make her strong" !
�Secretary-Treasurer,
Asbury Theological Seminary Alumni Association
Wilmore, Kentucky.
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The Perfection Concept in the Epistle
To the Hebrews *
Alvin A. Ahern
Introduction
The idea of perfection has long in
trigued the moral philosopher as well
as the theologian. Plato's ethics en
visaged the final attainment by man
of moral perfection through eros. Im-
manuel Kant's postulate of immortal
ity was based on the idea that moral
value is potentially complete. Some of
our contemporaries, for instance,
Wilbur Marshall Urban, stress a teleo-
logical ethics that contemplates com
pleteness in full self-realization.
Perhaps the moral theorist generally
has thought beyond his own time, but
he has also rendered a practical service
for his time. Though the practical
interests of politics and economics, for
instance, often try to ignore moral
requirements, the ethical thinker is
generally on hand to show that even
tually they must find that any security
they have is a moral security.
Recently science seems to have
shocked most of the thinking world
into a realization that humanity's
])roblem today is essentially a moral
problem. Perhaps it is not rash to
infer, therefore, that the confusion of
our post-war world is primarily a
moral confusion. If this is true what
can Bible instructors do to help cor
rect this situation?
They can do what many of them are
doing,"^ They can help an otherwise
literate world tnrn again to the Scrip
tures with eyes to see and ears to hear
* Reprinted from THE JOURNAL OF BIBLE
AND RELIGION, Vol. XIV, No. 3, August,
1946 by kind permission of the editor, Carl Ev
erett Purinton, and by consent of the author.
the great moral pronouncements and
to understand the moral provisions
found particularly in the ancient
prophets and in the New Testament.
The Bible is always contemporary;
therefore, the present study approach
es the Epistle to the Hebrews in the
confidence that a message for our day
may be found.
In 1889 Brooke Foss Westcott
opened the preface to his commentary
on the Epistle to the Hebrews with the
statement : "Every student of the
Epistle to the Hebrews must feel that
it deals in a peculiar degree with the
thoughts and trials of our own time."^
Three years later he concluded the
preface to his second edition with the
observation: ''The more I study the
tendencies of the time in some of the
busiest centres of English life, the
more deeply I feel that the Spirit of
God warns us of our most urgent civil
and spiritual dangers through the
prophecies of Jeremiah and the Epis
tle to the Hebrews. May our Nation
and our Church be enabled to learn
the lessons which they teach while
there is still time to use them."^
^^'as Westcott's hope fulfilled? Ap
parently not. Within twenty years
W'orid War I broke and subsequent
events are familiar to us all.
xMcNicol, writing of the Epistle to
the Hebrews in the Biblical Review
for October, 1930, on the eve of the
recent world confiict, declares, "The
message of this unknown, but clear-
1 Westcott, Brooke Foss : The Epistle To The
Hebrews, p. v.
2 Ibid., p. X.
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sighted, first century leader was never
more needed than it is today."
The present study foregoes treat
ment of many interesting and reward
ing topics and concerns itself with a
somewhat neglected emphasis in the
epistle, viz., the concept of perfection
and its ethical implications.
The Idea of teleiosis
Mr. Westcott suggests that "The
idea of teleiosis, consummation, bring
ing to perfection, is characteristic of
the Epistle."^ Christians have often if
not generally faltered at the thought
of perfection. It is awe-inspiring, as
awe-inspiring as the atomic bomb. Per
haps it even more real and more
weighted with significance.
In the epistle the Greek word
teleios, ordinarily translated perfect
or perfection, appears in one form
or anotlier sixteen times. The whole
family of words connected with
teleios is found here: teleios (5:14,
9:11), teleiotes ( 6 :1, elsewhere only
in Col. 3:14), teleioun referring to
Christ (2:10; 5:9; 7:28) and to men
(10:14; 11:40; 12:23).
The noun teleiotes is quite com
mon in classical Greek. According to
the Liddell and Scott lexicon it
"means having reached its end, fin
ished, complete. ... It is used in ref
erence to animals as full-grown, to
persons as complete or accomplished."
Tlsayer says it means "brougJit to its
end, finished, wanting nothing neces
sary to completeness; perfect."
In the epistle the idea is related
particularly to Christ and to his fol
lowers. First, he himself is "perfect
ed" as indicated in the three passages,
2 :10 ; 5 :9 ; and 7 :28. Second, he "per
fects" others, noted in three more spe
cial passages, 10:14; 11:39,40; 12:23.
The writer also seeks to show that
whereas man should be perfect (5:14;
6:1) he could not become so under the
3 Westcott, Op. cit., p. 63.
Old Covenant provisions (7:11,19;
9:9; 10:1).
Space here permits only a summary
of a rather extended investigation of
these various passages. The whole
argument leads to the conclusion that :
(1) In spite of sin God's purpose
and plan for man's moral perfection is
ultimately and effectively achieved
through Christ as Redeemer.
(2) The writer also holds that in
order for Christ to become the Saviour
He must follow the tedious and pain
ful process of encountering and over
coming sin at every possible point in
human experience.
(3) Furthermore, the perfection of
the believer is a sort of paradox.
Though per-fect in Christ, his achieve
ment is a continuing process. The
teaching of this phase of the epistle
might well be thought of as the "per
fection paradox."
The Standard for Man
In outlining these provisions of re
demption the author indicates God's
standard or goal for man. Further
more, he reasons that this standard is
within reach and that responsibility
for its attainment is upon man him
self. In chapter two, verses six
through eighteen, the standard is pre
sented and Christ is shown to have
met fully all specifications and in so
doing has made it possible for every
man to do the same. Elaboration of
this point must also be omitted from
this report. But it should be noted
that right here in this second chapter
there seems to be suggested a meta
physical basis for a teleological Chris
tian ethics of self-realization.
In his Fondren Lectures of 1945,
recently published, Edgar S. Bright-
man emphasizes the distinction be
tween an ideal and a value, pointing
out that an ideal is not a value but a
goal. A value is the goal attained or
the extent of its attainment. In He
brews 2 :6-18 we see man's exalted
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goal or destiny. But we see more. We
see Jesus as Son of Man attaining that
ideal. That is value. And for us that
value, according to the author of the
epistle, seems to lie in the fa'ct that his
accomplishment makes it possible for
all men to achieve in like manner
through Him. One of the chief pur
poses, if not the chief purpose, of this
epistle, therefore, seems to be to show
that though the Old Covenant under
the Law could not free man frQm the
power and condemnation of sin, the
"more perfect" covenant through
Christ makes victory over sin, as well
as freedom from a. sense of its guilt, a
present and continuous reality in the
life of the believer. Jesus Christ is at
once man's Ideal and man's Value.
Through man's identification of him
self with Christ the moral quality of
Christ's own being is imparted. The
writer of the epistle cites Jesus as the
perfect embodiment of God's ideal for
man and concludes that through this
"perfected" One all men may find
moral completion a present and at the
same time a progressive reality.
Thus through the use of the word-
family of teleios and a few related
terms the author seeks to show that
the Perfect Offering (7:26-28; 9:11,
15, 20; 10:10) of the Perfected One
(2:10; 5:9; 7:26-28; 10:10) Perfects
the Believer (6:1; 7:25; 9:11,15; 10:
10, 14; 12:23).
The PERFEcrnoN Paradox Clarified
In his comprehensive work, The
Meaning of God in Human Experience,
William Ernest Hocking, Emeritus
Professor of Philosophy at Harvard
University, proposes an idea that
throws light on this discussion and
deserves far more attention than it
has received. He speaks of religion as
"anticipated attainment." Says he,
in com])aring art and religion,
Art is long; religion is immediate. The attain
ment in every art is future, infinitely distant; the
attainment of religion is present. . . . Religion,
we may now say, is the present attainment in a
single experience of those objects which in the
course of nature are reached only at the end of
infinite progression. Religion is anticipated at-
tainment.4
On the other hand he shows that,
Whatever may be the nature of that anticipa
tion of all attainment, genuine religion is not in
clined � as far as hard work goes � to take
advantage of its advantage. If being in the world
it is not of the world, it is none the less with the
world and for it�in brief in for it, and with no
loss of power. This is an extraordinary attain-
ment which one must still labor forever to pos
sess: but just this paradox is inherent in the reli
gious consciousness. 5
In this same connection Hocking also
notes that,
In time my moral task will never be finished,
for my imperfection is infinite and my progress
by small degrees; but religion calls upon me to
be perfect at once even as God is perfect, and in
religion somehow I am perfect.6
This same idea also seems to be il
lustrated by St. Paul in Philippians,
chapter 3, verses 12-15.
Not that I have already obtained, or am already
made perfect (teteleiomai) : but I press on, if
so be that I may lay hold on that for which
also I was laid hold on by Christ Jesus. Breth
ren, I count not myself yet to have laid hold:
but one thing I do, forgetting the things which
are behind, and stretching forward to the things
which are before, I press on toward the goal vmto
the prize of the high calling of God in Christ
Jesus. Let us therefore, as many as are perfect
(tclcioi) be thus minded.
In one instance he considers him
self to be perfect, complete, mature in
(Jhrist, in another as not being perfect.
He seems to say, in harmony with the
vrriter to the Hebrews, that his per
fection, though in a very true sense a
present reality, is something'for which
he must strive continually with single
purpose.
The perfect, striving for perfection !
It sounds paradoxical. Perhaps it is.
Have not the holiest saints been the
4 Hocking, William Ernest, The Meaning of
God in Human Experience, p. 31.
5 Ibid., p. 32. (Second italics are my own.)
^Ibid., p. 31. (Italics are my own.)
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first to declare their constant need of
holiness, perhaps just as Socrates in
sisted that he knew nothing, though
declared by the Oracle at Delphi to be
the wisest man in Athens?
While emphasizing the experience
of inner perfection through faith the
author of the epistle recognizes that
the perfecting process continues as
long as life itself. The Christian is
able to make progress in the direction
of the ideal goal of moral perfection
simply because, through faith in
Christ, he actually experiences Christ's
moral perfection in kind, though not
in degree. And though a man may be
becoming progressively more perfect,
Kant was probably right in a sense,
when he conceived of man's moral en
deavor as an eternal thing.
The author of our epistle makes this
progress in perfection particularly
explicit in the eloquent benediction at
the close of the letter.
Now the God of peace, who brought again
from the dead the great shepherd of the sheep
with the blood of an eternal covenant, even our
Lord Jesus, make you perfect in every good thing
to do his will, working in us that which is well
pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ; to
whom be the glory for ever and ever. Amen.7
He prays that the inner perfection of
his readers may be externalized
through everything they do. Interest
ingly, here the word translated "per
fect'' is no*t a form of the verb teleious,
but is Latartisai, which is the first
aorist optative active of the verb katar-
tiz'o. It is a combination of kata, which
here denotes "in succession, in course,''
and artios, which means "entirely
suited; complete in accomplishment,
ready.'' It would appear that the
writer has employed this compound
word to emphasize the thought of per
fection being achieved in the success
ive experiences of life, "in every good
thing to do his will." Thus the para
dox continues. He who is morally
perfect in Christ through faith in his
7 Hebrews 13 :20, 21.
suflftcient atonement for sin must go
on in his endless quest for perfection
in Christian living.
Possibilities of Further
Development
Dr. W. E. Sangster, an English
writer, in his recent book. The Path
to Perfection (1943), quotes from an
address by Dr. R. W. Dale in Carrs
Lane Chapel, Birmingham, England,
July 27, 1879. The distinguished
divine and educational reformer was
attempting a dispassionate, appraisal
of John Wesley's infiuence. Among
other things Dr. Dalfe declared:
There was one doctrine of John Wesley's�the
doctrine of perfect sanctification�which ought to
have led to a great and original ethical develop
ment ; but the doctrine has not grown ; it seems
to remain just where John Wesley left it. There
has been a want of the genius or the courage to
attempt the solution of the immense practical
questions which the doctrine suggests. The ques
tions have not been raised�much less solved. To
have raised them effectively, indeed, would have
been to originate an ethical revolution which
would have had a far deeper effect on the thought
and life�first of England, and then of the rest
of Christendom�than was produced by the Ref
ormation of the sixteenth century.8
It is my personal belief, after a
rather careful study of the Epistle to
the Hebrews during the past ten years,
that this concept of perfection, as
there presented, suggests a metaphys
ical basis for a teleological Christian
ethics of self-realization whose social
implications are far-reaching.
Is it possible that Christians might
exert a greater moral impact on the
life of today if they more nearly real
ized in their own experience the pos
sibilities of the "perfection paradox"?
Perhaps believers have always been
conscious of the Ideal and of their
failure to measure up to it. But have
they been conscious enough of a pres
ent inner moral completeness in an
experience suggested as possible by
8 Sangster, Dr. W. E., The Path to Perfection.
p. 168.
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Dr. Hocking's theory of "anticipated
attainment"? Might not such an ex
perience afford a moral dynamic and
resourcefulness that would enable man
to win his individual and social strug
gle with the problems of evil? Is it
failure at this point that is responsible
chiefly for the recurring indictment
tliat Christianity is not "practical"?
Is Christianity being really (or real
istically) practiced by its professed
followers?
In this day of breath-taking discov
ery in the fields of the sciences
perhaps there can be found a frame of
mind that is prepared not only to
entertain but to demand a solution of
our moral problems in terms of this
"perfection paradox," which appears
to characterize the Epistle to the He
brews. Dr, Sangster seems to have
been in such a frame of mind when in
concluding the study mentioned above,
he declares,
Td believe that the human heart can be cleansed
from sin (experience moral perfection) is a
bold, big thing to believe, and we have protested
against any easy assimiption that it has been done
because this is fraught with dreadful dangers,
not the least of which is a subtle discouragement
against being honest with oneself. But the op
posite conviction, so it seems to the writer, is not
less terrible.^
The unmodified core of this state
ment is especially provocative. " To
believe that the human heart can be
cleansed from sin is a bold, big thing
to believe . . . But the opposite con
viction ... is not less terrible."
If John Wesley was on the right
track in his doctrine of perfection, and
the Epistle to the Hebrews seems to
suggest that he was, surely it is time
this doctrine received more serious
consideration with a view toward Its
future development and toward its
enlarged social application.
9 Ibid., p. 190. (Parenthesis and italics are my
own.)
^Can Religious Education Be Christian?'
A Critique Of Harrison Elliott^s Volume
C. Elvan Olmstead
Perhaps the greatest value of this
recent contribution to the Coe-Bower
school of thought is the panoramic �
one might almost say kaleidoscopic �
view which it affords of so much that
is being said in theological and educa
tional circles. It makes a number of
emphases which are of considerable
significance. Our first concern, how
ever, in order that we may discuss the
book intelligently, is to bring into
focus just what it says. For this pur
pose perhaps the best procedure will
be to state in one sentence what seems
to be the main point in each of the fif
teen chapters. Such a statement is
herewith given :
I. The modern educational ap
proach "has implications which chal
lenge the theological assumptions of
the churches,"^ and especially of those
theologians who stress the thought
that "Christianity is a revealed reli
gion."^
II. Religious liberty was won in
America as far as public education
was concerned, but the "Sunday
School carried on the authoritarian
tradition."^
III. The Herbartian procedure,
which attempts to impose an idea
upon pupils and then leaves to them
l^uttiiig it into practice, has at last
been "challenged from within the of
ficial Chidstian education of the
churches themselves.""^
IV. There is at present a clash of
opinions as to whether the educational
and missionary work of the church
should be conceived as the propagation
1 Elliott, Harrison S. : Can Religious Education
be Christian f (New York, Macmillan, 1940), p. 4.
2 Ibid., p. 10.
3 Ibid., p. 23.
p. 62.
of an authoritative "apostolic theo-
centric" faith,^ or as a shared study of
religion with liberty for all to arrive
at personal interpretations.
V. No uniform interpretation of the
Christian faith is given in the New
Testament, therefore people today
must be free to "find for themselves
the meaning of the Christian faith.
^^I. Paul and Barth to the contrary,
human knowledge is important for the
understanding of religion and for "re
vising the interpretations where they
have been influenced by inadequate or
false conceptions."^
VII. The conception of the auto
cratic sovereignty of God leads, not to
"the direct reign of God but the au
thority of parents, teachers, ministers,
and rulers which is identified with the
will of God."8
VIII. There is need for more dis
crimination in the use of the word
"sin," and for suiting "what is done
in the educational process to the char
acter of the difficulty."^
IX. The effort to deal with the hu
man predicament through an educa
tional process is not made impractic
able by the evil tendencies of human
nature, for "there are no such well-
defined inborn tendencies in man, ei
ther good or evil."^�
X. The social strategy of educntion
is that of organizing the life of grou])s
in such a way that "t'le individual is
turned from individual striving to co
operative effort,"^^ thereby removin.L^'
5 Ibid., p. 78.
6 Ibid., p. 120.
7 Ibid., p. 135.
8 Ibid., p. 153.
9 Ibid., p. 176.
^oibid., p. 191.
^Ubid., p. 212.
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the clash between egos.
XI. "If religious education is to be
thus basically reconstructive, there
must be a shift from efforts to help
individuals as individuals to the en
listment of individuals in the recon
struction of the life of which they are
a part,"^^ and by which their own
characters are inevitably conditioned.
XII. Christian ethics is relevant to
an educational process centered in ac
tual situations : "the ideal of love can
be made both the goal and the dynamic
of such a process."^^
XIII. "The social process of reli
gious education, which critics of reli
gious education fear because they
think it is centered too much in human
life, is the very process which gives
the largest promise of bringing about
a vital experience of God."^"*
XIV. Religious education "will
need to embody in worship the recog
nition . . . that whatever the inter
pretation of God, his manifestations
and resources are immanent in his
world; second, that these resources
ai'e available only as man discovers
and meets the conditions for their re-
lease."^^
XV. A social and experience-cen
tered educational process may be
trusted when "individuals and groups
have been captured by the possibilities
of love made manifest in Christ."^^
This summary of Elliott's thought
reveals that the integrating idea in the
negative phase of his argument is that
"An experience-centered educational
l)r()('ess is inconsistent . . . with posi
tions dogmatically and finally held."^^
His constructive proposals call for en
gaging people in cooperative effort
toward that approximation of the
Kingdom of God "which is possible to
human beings in their social arrange-
12 Ibid., p. 226.
13 Ibid., p. 246.
i^Ibid., p. 278.
151bid., pp. 297-98.
16 Ibid., p. 321.
17 Ibid., p. 317.
ments."^^
There is much truth in the position
that in order best to help individuals
we must get them moving cooperative
ly toward a goal. A pamphlet entitled
"Goal-Conscious Churches" recently
sent out by Presbyterian Theological
Seminary, Chicago (now McCormick
Theological Seminary) says, "When
the members of a church are working
together with a common purpose that
is worthy of their combined resources,
trivial personality-adjustment and so
cial-adjustment problems are sub
merged. They are kept out of the area
of serious concem and of action."
Truly, the wholehearted service of a
cause has power to lift one above petty
worries and jealousies. A lack of some
thing significant to do is a factor in
even major personality disorders. An
or<>anism is set to function, and when
it is prevented from functioning dis
ruptive results may be expected. And
then, whether people need the physical
and spiritual exercise or not, there are
needs which call so imperatively for
self-s^acrificing attention that it be
hooves the church to move toward
meeting them. A church which sits
idly by while Satan is mobilizing his
forces can hardly expect to survive it
self.
In the final paragraph of the book
Elliott says that confidence can be
[placed in the educational process, that
is, in the sort of program he has been
sketching, "only as individuals and
groups have been captured by the pos
sibilities of love made manifest in
Christ, as the goal of the Kingdom of
God has become the dominating pur
pose of their lives, and as fellowship
with God has become an actual ex
perience."^^ In this statement he
conies very near to giving away his
whole case. He admits that his pro
gram of action is valid only after what
may be considered the chief aims of
18 Ibid., p. 321.
19 Ibid., p. 321.
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Christian education have been at
tained. What he has done is to move
the focus of attention out beyond the
individuals with whom we have to deal
into the social scene. The task of the
church is to reeducate society, not
simply to save souls. He as much as
says that changing society is the way
to save souls. There are, he says,
enough church members in the country
to turn tlie tide. But as valid as this
phase of his program is, we need to
remember that such was not the meth
od of the early Christian church. The
members of that church did not go
out preaching a message of social re
form to be carried out by their still
pagan neighbors as a means of bring
ing the Kingdom of God. Rather, the
message was an offer of salvation from
sin and an invitation to fellowship
with God and the brethren in Christ.
On the basis of Elliott's own state
ment some such evangelistic work had
to precede the program of social edu
cation. People had to be captured by
Christian ideals before they could be
expected to act in accordance v.'ith
them. Almost the only atteniion he
has given to this phase of the problem
in this book is to admit that some peo
ple will not accept the Christian way
of life. The main objection, then, to
his program of social education is not
what he proposes, but what he leaves
unsaid.
There is, however, an assumption
behind all of Elliott's thinking which
will be unacceptable to many membei's
of the existing churches, and which
clashes sharply with the point of view
of this paper. This is his ])osition of
naturalism. Elliott would not consent
to be called a non-theist, though he
leaves it an open question as far as
the subject in hand is concerned
whether God is other than "distinc
tive and pervading characteristics of
the universe as it impinges upon hu
man life."^� At any rate Elliott places
20 Ibid., p. 293.
all the stress on the immanence of the
divine, rather than on God's tran
scendence, and on human activity in
discovering and using the given re
sources in the universe rather than
on the self-revealing and saving power
of God.
Such an emphasis furnishes a cor
rective for an uncritical supernatural
ism. On the other hand, it leaves out
what is most distinctive in New Tes
tament Christianity. The central em
phasis on love is retained, but the
question of the personal existence of
God is treated as so unessential that
it may be passed by. The whole tre
mendous issue of life after death is
waived with the single word "other
worldly." Jesus is central in the
Christian religion, but such teachings
of his as have been preserved for us
hardly supply us with an authoritative
faith. Sin is treated as a psychological
and social problem. The communion
of saints is passed by as a worth-while
goal of Christian education. The el
ement of tragedy in life is recognized
at least verbally, but is hardly handled
seriously. The possibility of direct aid
by God in answer to prayer is not a
part of the picture. The experience of
the "new birth" has been more or less
a failure as far as the larger condition
of society is concerned. Thus Elliott
leaves in the background everything
which reaches bevond the natural
order of events, and says that if condi
tions are to be changed, we are the
ones who will have to see that it is
done. If it were convenient, one won
ders what would keep Elliott from
taking the final step into out-and-out
humanism.
AVe must not allow ourselves to be
thrown into a Parthian type of re
action against this immanentist point
of view. God has called his children to
be workers together with him. Truly,
the fields are ripe and the laborers are
few. But it is God who both gives the
harvest and sustains by his fellowship
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those who go to reap it. We should not
allow oureelves to be deceived by the
remnants of conventional terminology
which Elliott retains as to his real
meaning behind them. There must be
fellowship with God � yes. But it is
not clear in what sense one is to have
fellowship with "the Given, which we
call God,"^^ or how one is to find "that
courage in the presence of defeat and
calm in the face of tragedy, which the
experience of the i)rovidential relation
of God to human life and destmy in
historic prayer and worship sup-
plied."^^
In view of the fact that Elliott
shares a point of view which has di
verged so widely from traditional
Christianity, it is not surprising that
he should lay great stress on freedom
from any fixed orthodoxy. It is well
also to keep in mind that p]lliott is a
discussion leader, and that for him
"conference" is the central education
al method. It would be easy for such
a person to drift into an attitude that
anything which is not problematical is
not important. Some such assnmi)tion
lies just l>elow the surface in the j�rcs-
ent book. It is important for us, how
ever, to distinguish two a.spects of the
question, whether real education must
be based on problem solving. One is
whether this is the only approach
which results in vital learning, which
Elliott clearly implies is the case.
The other aspect of the question is
whether this is the only aT>proacli
which is desirable, even if other
approaches are practicable. Elliott's
attitude on this is strongly in the
affirmative, as far as the general spii-it
of an educational process is concerned.
A school without the discussion of
problems would be to him a very
stupid place.
Relative to the first half of the
problem, N. E. Richardson says, "The
21 Ibid., p. 293.
22 Ibid., p. 290.
23 Cf. Ibid., p. 247.
convictions are spreading rapidly in
the churches that an authoritative
scripture can be taught creatively . . .
that spontaneity of belief can be real
ized as a result of indoctrina
tion . , . ."^"^ This doubtless represents
the point of view which Elliott char
acterizes as a modified Herbartianism,
according to which the best education
al techniques may be adapted to teach
ing ideas determined beforehand. It
hardly seems that it will be possible
for Elliott to rule this out as effective
education. Certainly he would have to
go beyond the rather superficial way
in w hich he disposes of Herbartianism.
in the present book. But even on his
own itsycliological grounds the effect-
ivene.'-is of such a program as Richard
son suggests seems probable. Elliott
accei-ts the tlieoiy that human nature
is (|uite plastic in the 3'oung, and so
avoids a defeatist emphasis on human
dej cavity. But this very plasticity
maRes possible a wide variety of edu
cational procedures which may be used
with success � if making mental
changes may be called success. Be
sieges, is it not a matter of common ob-
sei vation that a person with convic
tions can pass these convictions on to
others without necessarily going
through all the reasons for and against
his point of view? Indeed, Elliott him
self says there is a need for some au
thority. Adults should give guidance
"as the basis for a true autonomy. "^^
So he implicitly admits that at least
some elements of so-called Herbartian
ism can be effective.
We turn to the more important ques
tion of the desirahiJitij of indoctrina
tion. It is a timely question, in view
of the recent upsurge of the militant
forces of totalitarianism and the con
sequent reemphasis on the democratic
way of life. It is a question which calls
24 In a review of Elliott's book in the Alumni
Rci iczv, Presbyterian Theological Seminary, Vol.
XM, No. 3 (Jan. 1941), pp. 179-80.
25 Elliott, op. cit., p. 166.
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for careful and discriminating
thought. One recalls William James'
recognition of the fact that the needs
of the audience have a bearing on the
attitude which a speaker should take.
He said in the preface that if he had
been addressing the Salvation Army
he should have reversed the emphasis
given in The Will to Believe. There
are dogmatic groups which need the
corrective of such an emphasis as El
liott has given. Indeed, because of
their fixed ideas, conservative people
are often unable to interpret the actual
content of the Bible as accurately as
those who do not take that content as
seriously. Perhaps Elliott's book
would have some influence on such
groups, if they would read it. But it
does not have as much at this point to
olfer to those who are already confused
and confusing their hearers in the
name of liberal Christianity. Perhaps
it will furnish them the rationale with
which to approach their traditionalist
neighbors in a continnued spirit of
controversy. At least, Elliott brings
the issues out into view.
The real point is, not that there is
no place for the authority of those
who know, but that Elliott does not
believe that traditional Christian be
liefs can be substantiated. If what is
asked for is absolute proof, that is
true. On the other hand, the interpre
tations favored by the immanentist
view cannot be proven either as hav
ing the exclusive truth. Yet Elliott
does not exactly say that since notli-
ing is conclusive we might as well let
everybody take his choice. He certain
ly would try to keep people from ac
cepting a Barthian point of view. He
wants the educational process to be
based on his premises. These prem
ises involve his naturalistic point of
view. Because Homrighausen holds
that (in Elliott's words) "the religion
which is to be taught is authoritative
because it is a direct revelation from
God," Elliott says of him, "He is
basically in conflict with the theory of
progressive education. "^^ This shows
that a basic consideration is the valid
ity of revelation. For the most part
Elliott tries to sidestep the question
by showing that, whatever valid rev
elation there may have been, the inter
pretations of it are not dependable, or
at least do not all agree. He goes
through the New Testament with his
nmgnifying glass looking for diverg
encies, rather than for basic unities.
With a similar approach it is probable
that he would find that even progress
ive educators are in disagreement with
one another. Still he would have us
see the real source of authority "in the
educational process itself."^'' Appar
ently we must choose a point of view
before we can project a program.
Elliott grants the importance of
convictions.^^ But are we to be allowed
to pass our convictions on to others?
He holds that religious education
should not become "a means for indoc
trinating children and youth in a par
ticular set of Christian interpreta
tions."^^ If by this he means that it is
undesirable to make children feel that
in order to be a Christian one must be
a member of a particular church, cer
tainly his position is justified. But he
goes much farther than this. He sides
with the report of the Laymen's In
quiry which would rescind Christ's
commission to make disciples of all na
tions and would have us look forward
to the "continued co-existence"^" of
Christianity and non-Christian reli
gions. This is not acceptable as the
program of the churches. What the
church is commissioned to preach is
Christ and the power of his resurrec
tion, not the eventual merger of all
faiths into a sort of Baha-ism. As be
lievers that Jesus embodied the way.
26 Ibid., p. 69.
27 Ibid., p. 320.
28 Ibid., p. 317.
29 Ibid., p. 318.
30 Ibid., p. 77.
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the truth, and the life, Christians
must witness to that conviction and
persuade men of its truth.
We jiow turn to certain other as
pects of Elliott's thought which may
be apuroached by a consideration of
the concept of "experience." This is a
good Methodist word as well as a pro
gressive educator's word. The two
lines of thought mingle in what Elliott
says. In fact, a certain basic relation
ship exists between the meanings of
the word in the two senses. The par
son and the pedagogue would both tell
you that it is not enough for a young
ster to learn his Sunday-school lesson ;
the truth must enter into his experi
ence. It begins to come into view that
"experience'' should not be understood
simply in the sense of activities. It is
something psychological, and as snch
centers in the mind of the individual.
Sleepwalking does not qualify as ex
perience in the full sense of the term.
Likewise, a hurried repetition of the
Loi'd's prayer to get it out of the way
does not qualify as constructive expe
rience. What is done must be planned
so as to have its full effect within the
personality of those participating.
T'his vital emphasis is brought into
play by Elliott in his treatment of sin.
One needs to be guarded; psychiatric
treatment should not be substituted for
faith in God. But Elliott sounds a
much-needed note when he points out
the disadvantages of applying the
word "sin" to nearly everything we do
regardless of the attitude of the per
sons involved. It is in this area that
one may be most enthusiastic in sup-
])ort of Elliott in his opposition to a
Barthian and Calvinistic theology.
Here, also, at the point of experi
ence, we shake hands on the question
of authority. However sure one may
be of the truth of ('hristianity, yet in
dividuals must not be forced in their
acceptance of it by inquisitorial
methods. This is not to say that no
distinction is to be made between
Christians and non-Christians; it may
be insisted upon, when men are apply
ing for positions of leadership in the
church. But a faith which is to oper
ate from inside a person must be will
ingly accepted by the person. He must
begin to act on it as his own chosen
way of life. The thought of Christ
waiting patiently outside the door is
of the utmost significance. Whether
he stands at the threshold of a child
or of an adult, the door must be un-
laiched from within. Otherwise the
motions of piety may be secured for
a time, but deep convictions have not
taken hold of the life.
This should not be interpreted as
meaning, as Elliott would lead us to
believe, that the Herbartian procedure
has no place. A restudy of Herbart
would le'.eal that Herbart was con
cerned that learning should become a
vital part of children's experience.
The main difficulty probably was that
his emphasis was too exclusively intel
lectual. For the teaching of content
the Herbartian procedure is still valid.
What must be pointed out is that
other procedures in line with Elliott's
program should be combined with it to
give a rounded experience of Chris
tian education, expressing and based
on an abiding faith.
The Creative Mind. By Henri Berg-
son. (Translated by Mabelle L.
Andison.) New York: Philosoph
ical Library, 1946. 307 pages.
$3.75.
Philosophical Library has rendered
a service in publishing a series of
essays, dealing with philosophical
method, by the late Henri Bergson.
All but the first two were published
before, between 1903 and 1926, but
were in French and out of print. The
two introductory essays at the begin
ning of the volume are now published
for the first time and afford an intro
duction to this volume and to the au
thor's philosophical system . These
are significant chiefly for their auto
biographical interest and the light
they shed on the early development of
Bergson's thought. One does not find
therefore the maturity of thought that
is best seen in his later book, Two
Sources of Morality and Religion,
(1935).
The new essays describe the author's
admiration of Spencer's philosophical
system and his dissatisfaction with his
method; he found Spencer's doctrine
of evolution blind to the nature of
change itself and in need of recasting
(l). 13). Along with this he was dis
turbed by the complete lack of preci
sion in philosophy and sought to de
fine more accurately the concepts of
time and space. He found that they
are generally confused so the "when
we evoke time, it is space which an
swers the call." Ambiguity of lan
guage he found responsible for the
equating of time and space and dis
covered that duration, transition,
process is the elusive concept which
leads to a discovery of reality. When
considering duration the mind ordinar
ily thinks only of fixed points in a
sequence, "immobilities, real or pos
sible, . . . simple snapshots we have
taken once again along the course of
change, (p. 16). He concludes that it
is "the continuity of transition," flux,
"change itself that is real." Logic or
intellection is too bound to the past;
it must be made more supple in order
to grasp the present, the immediate,
the factual.
Bergson found that intellectual in
tuition, "the direct vision of the mind
by the mind," rather than reason
alone, is the path to certainty. While
Kant said the "thing in itself" escapes
us because we do not possess an intui
tive faculty to comprehend it, Bergson
insisted that "at least part of reality,
our person, can be grasped in its
natural purity." Thus he felt that he
had found the way to achieve more
precision in philosophical method.
As William James pointed out Berg
son's stvle, even in translation, is
remarkable for lucidity of expression.
Like Aristotle he surveys all his pred
ecessors and asserts his sujjerior
insight and accuracy. Like Kant his
earlier writings are more provocative
and original than his later ones in
which a more cautious and conserva
tive attitude is discerned. In his later
books he apparently makes a gi'eater
effort to come to terms with tradition
al Christianity. The influence of Hera-
clitus and Zeno on Bergson's mental
development is apparent in this
intellectual autobiography. Like his
contemporary William James he re
volted against the fixed intellectualism
of his day and like James and White
head he went from science into
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philosophy. While insisting upon the
discipline of the scientific method he
does not stop until the nature of things
is perceived by direct insight or ex
perience.
While many sentences and epigrams
of Bergson are attractive the total
picture is disappointing. The lack of
precision which he deplores in philos
ophy seems to characterize his own
verbiage. He is perhaps more the
creature of his age than the pioneer- of
a new one. In revolting against a
static intellectual universe he has gone
to the other extreme of deifying fiux.
Reality is to be found in the static as
well as in the dynamic; both are
equally essential.
More valuable are his counsels on
educational procedure. He pleads for
the inductive method in public edu
cation, saying that manual training
should be intellectual discipline as
YvcU as relaxation. "Bookish learn
ing rei)resses valuable creative urges."
(p. 102). The teacher's task is to stir
up initiative. Valuable also is his
insistence, in Platonic fashion, that
direct insight is won only at the price
of the most arduous intellectual dis
cipline in the exact sciences. By in
sisting that philosophy be more
precise, that it welcome the intuitive
as well as the intellectual, and in
showing that science should go beyond
description to interpretation, he has
suggested the possibility of a better
synthesis between these two disci
plines. Any effort to make philosophy
less intellectually complacent and
science more aware of its limitations
should be interesting to religion.
George A. Turner
The Alcaniiif/ of Sanctipcation, by
Charles Ewing Brown. Anderson,
Indiana : The Warner Press, 1944.
232 pages. |2.00.
In the opinion of the reviewer this
title is one of the finest on the subject
to appear in recent years. It is not
written for the scholar primarily nor
is it intended as a polemic; it "is not
written to give battle, but to give
light" as the author expresses it. It
is written for Christians to help an
swer intellectual difficulties and afford
practical guidance in understanding
and expounding the doctrine and ex
perience. The viewpoint frankly is
Wesleyan and in harmony with the
Arniinian branch of the modern holi
ness movement. Within these limits
the author may be said to have abun
dantly fulfilled his stated purpose in
writing. While popular and practical
in style the background of careful
scholarship is everywhere apparent.
There is also noticeable a spiritual in
sight, maturity, and sanity which
inspires confidence. AVhile little orig
inality is claimed oi- desired there is a
freshness of treatment throughout.
The author takes cognizance of some
Jewish literature outside the canon
and indicates acquaintance with
theological thought apart from the
Wesleyan tradition. This is used
eff(M-tively to enforce and enrich the
writer's Wesleyan interpretation.
From the standpoint of pure scholar
ship assumptions are sometimes made
that would be inacceptable to many.
In most instances however the author
treads carefully and indicates an
awareness of the critical problems in
volved. Most important of all the
reviewer has not noticed any instances
where evidence was consciously or
unconsciously distorted in the interest
of a theological position. The material
could probably have been organized
in a more orderly plan, but perfection
is not claimed in this respect and the
organization is no worse than most
others on the same subject. In parts
of the book orte wishes that a clearer
distinction had been drawn between
the Biblical meaning and the theolog
ical traditions that have subsequently
developed.
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The author is Associate Professor
of Theology in Anderson College and
Theological Seminary. He is also
Editor in Chief of The Gospel Trum
pet, official organ of The Church of
God, having as its purpose, "the salva
tion of sinners, entire sanctification
of believers, divine healing of the body,
and the unity of all true Christians in
'the faith once delivered to the saints'."
In several places the author ex
presses some fairly original view
points. For instance, issue is taken
with Sangster's statement that in
stincts cannot be sinful. Brown insists
that these primary urges have been
infected as a result of Adam's sin;
the original pattern is distorted by
selfish motives, resulting in infection
with a sinful condition analogous to
fever in the body. What is needed
therefore is not something to be ex
tracted so much as a diseased condi
tion rectified, (p. 93). He again de
fends tradition against Sangster's
criticism of sin as "a thing" by noting
that in the New Testament, as in Wes
ley, such language is admittedly
figurative rather than analytical or
descriptive, (p. 97). Following a sug
gestion from Bergson, Brown main
tains that temptations are present
even to the sanctified because of man's
liigh level of intelligence. Man's com
plex behaviour patterns have been
broken up by the expansion of the
intellect and even a holy man finds "a
tension in deciding against personal
selfish impulses in favor of his godly
moral instincts." (p. 91). Perhaps
Brown has here been influenced too
much by Bergson. How could "the
moral imaue of God" be an instinct (p.
92 ) ? What is the difference between
"instinct" and "impulse" in man (p.
91)?
Like W. B. Pope this author finds
that Reformation creeds were under
the influence of IManicheism in their
refusal to admit the possibility of
complete deliverance from sin in this
life. (p. 153). Valuable also, among
other things, is the emphasis on the
positive aspect of holiness and the
insistence that consecration means in
vestment.
While not intended as such, l)ecause
of its clear, sound, and judicious pres
entation of the Wesleyan message, the
book is perhaps as valuable for apol-
(tgetic as for devotional purposes.
George A. Turner
Philosophy In American Education�
Its Tasks and Opportunities. Sym
posium. New York : Harper &
Bros. Contributors: Brand, Blan-
shard, Swarthmore College; Curt
J. Ducasse, Brown University;
Charles W. Hendel, Yale Univer
sity; Arthur E. Murphy, Univer
sity of Illinois; Max C. Otto, Uni
versity of Wisconsin.
Early in 1943 a proposal was made
to the American Philosophical Asso
ciation that they undertake an investi
gation of the present status of philos
ophy, and of the part philosophy
might play in a post-war world. The
Rockefeller Foundation awarded a
generous grant to the Association for
such a study, and the volume, here re
viewed, is the outgrowth of the inquiry.
The five contributors to the book were
the ones appointed to the task. They
followed a procedure of counseling,
conferences, correspondence, and every
other available avenue of contact.
Those consulted were teachers, mem
bers of the American Philosophical
Association, scholars in other fields of
learning, poets, editors, lawyers, cler
gymen, educators in public schools
and junior colleges, administrators,
business men, government officials,
etc. A wealth of critical observation
piled up, which serves as the back
ground for this symposium.
The book is divided into three main
divisions with two or more of the
writers presenting their particular
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viewpoints in each. The first division
deals with the contemporary situation
�the present status of American phi-
losopliy. Dr. Blanshard asserts that
philosophy in the schools is flourishing
as never before, and its influence ex
tends far beyond the walls of the class
room, but he feels that it does not hold
the place of importance it should have.
It is a commonplace that philosophy
was 'once the "Queen of the sciences,"
but today it has been pushed from its
central position by recent, more ag
gressive curricular material.
The primary reason for the present
survey is that liberal education has
been open to 'question as a result of
the war. W e have a wealth of educa
tive materials and tools, but is this
mass of knowledge integrated? Can
the imnmture learner find his way
through the maze of course selections
to clear sighted goals? Many of the
severest criticisms come froui educat
ors themselves. The demands on edu
cators and particularly philosophers
is that they provide (1) an integrated
in-ogram, (2) a unity in education, (3)
a reinteipretation of democracy, and
(4j an adequate philosophy of life.
Many other demands were expressed,
but the above were the most insistent
ones.
An issue frequently expressed con
cerned the nature of philosophy itself.
Is its function to reveal the nature of
things, to put into operation principles
of goodness, truth, beauty, etc., or is it
an agency of adjustment, an instru
ment for molding nature into the
service of desire?
Too many times philosoi>hers have
been criticized for their "ivory tower"
seclusion. They have remained aloof
from the objective realities of the
V oiid's needs. We cannot but admire
the writer for his review of the criti
cisms that have been hurled against
his profession.
In the survey of the present status,
Ai'thur K. :Murphy presents a review
of contemporary philosophy in the
American colleges. He discusses such
topics as "Speculative Idealism,"
"Pragmatism," "Realism," and the
place of "isms" in modem thought.
His plea is for a philosophic satura
tion for every college student.
In the second division of the book,
each writer contributes a chapter on
the task of philosophy. A picture of
the modern philosopher is drawn for
us. The criticisms, just and unjust,
are examined carefully, but his place
of leadership among scholarly think
ers is caiefully safeguarded. In the
chapter entitled "The Opportunity of
Philosophy" the emphasis is put on
the need for some unifying influence
on the selection of courses for the col
lege student. There is a growing feel
ing that the vocations and fields of
s]>ecialization have tended to develop
insular thinking; ])]iilosophy could
and sJioiihl offset this by utilizing its
resources of integrative values. The
other writers of this section continue
in the same vein ; a plea for philoso
phy's place in the sun.
Today there is the feel of academic
stirrings in the direction of curricular
rebuilding. Most of our colleges and
universities are contemplating more or
less radical changes; some are already
far ahead in a reconstruction program.
At least three reasons account for
this : (1) The war made major changes
in teaching staffs and student bodies;
(2) Financial limitations have forced
sharp reductions in the breadth of
course selections; (3) The impact of
contemporary criticisms is making
curricular changes imperative.
In the third section of the book the
authors present an excellent patt(T-n
for the liberal arts college and grad
uate school. The program outlined
lays special stress on unity and inte
gration. The place of philosophy as a
subject, and its various divisions �
ethics, logic, metaphysics, etc., are dis
cussed. The relationships l>etween
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philosophy and the humanities, the
sciences, arts and letters are thorough
ly presented. To be sure, much of the
proposed revision is quite nebulous in
outline; also, there are some differ
ences and disagreements; but all in
all, the pattern for curriculum build
ing suggested, could, by any educa
tional group, be considered with profit.
HiLDRETH Cross
Christ and Man's Dilemma, by George
A. Buttrick. Abingdon-Cokesbury
Press, 1946. 224 pp. |2.00.
The Reverend George Arthur But-
trick has produced in his Christ and
Mails Dilemma one of the outstanding
religious books of the year. This most
recent volume from the pen of the au
thor of such previous studies as The
Parables of Jesus, Jesus Came Preach
ing, The Christian Fact and Modern
Doubt, and Prayer strikes the same
high level of literary and religious ex
cellence as is found in his other vol
umes. With thorough-going and deep
spiritual insight the dilemma in which
modern man finds himself is set forth
on the one hand, while on the other
hand the complete adequacy of Christ
to meet man's entire needs is present
ed. And this Christ is none other than
God Incarnate who must needs suffer
the death of the cross and who rose
again. The Incarnation, the death,
and the resurrection are among the
essentials for Dr. Buttrdck.
Man's dilemma grows out of these
facts concerning him; he is ignorant,
he is wicked, he is mortal. As for his
ignorance, it is constitutional. The
hasic questions of life are unanswer
able by him. His science and philos
ophy, though making valuable contri
bution, come far short in ultimate so
lutions. IMan in his ignorance desir 's
a revelation. That revelation has come
to him in Jesus Christ who is God in
carnate. It is the Christ who is pre
sented in the New Testament, One
who claimed unique authority, who is
ultimate truth, ultimate loce, and who
claimed to forgive sin.
As for his wickedness, man is aware
of it, but at the same time is unable
in himself to effect any release from it.
The losses incurred by our wickedness
are beyond man's power to adequately
compute. Sin sears the memory, cank
ers the uill and is of such a nature
that human responsibility cannot be
evaded. In its inner tyranny and outer
ruin, sin is beyond our power to cure.
Therefore, only God can redeem our
wickedness, and in this work of re
demption, God must come to earth and
suffer, which He did in Jesus. The re
demptive act of God calls for a re
sponse on the part of the redeemed in
faith and life.
Though our modern age may try to
escape from the dilemma of mortality
by various devices, the fact still re
mains that man is mortal. Man is
aware of his mortality and yet there is
within him an instinctiveness of a cer
tain deathlessness. The New Testa
ment with its emphasis upon a resur
rected Christ is the answer that is
needed. And the New Testament does
not simply set forth immortality as
continued existence, but rather as
eternal life, life that has been re
deemed from sin. The Christian doc
trine of the hereafter is inseparable
from the C hristian doctrine of atone
ment.
In Chapter V our author finds that
the ignorance, sin, and mortality which
plague our humanity, enter as well
into man's business relationships.
Business, being human, has its ignor
ances, wickednesses, and mortality;
for man impresses upon all his enter-
pr-ises the dilemma of his own life.
And Christ as redeemer, Christ in the
individual business man is the only
salvation for business. Man must be
made good at heart if he is to do good
in life's relationships. Afotive in busi
ness as elsewhere must be love towaid
Jesus Christ.
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In his discussion of Christ and Edu
cation, our author finds that education
in America has become secular, large
ly as a result of our traditional doc
trine of separation of church and state
and a fear of religious indoctrination.
This fear has brought about a silence
concerning God and Jesus in secular
education, which has "indoctrinated
children to believe that God does not
exist and that Jesus Christ does not
matter."
Secular education, while professing
great faith in facts .and priding itself
in "objective mind" has its own as
sumptions concerning God, Christ, and
man, God is disregarded, Christ may
or may not have lived, and man needs
only to be set free for he is sufficient
in himself. As to the confiict between
authoritarian education and free edu
cation, Dr. Buttrick points out that
the universe is authoritarian yet free
dom is honored�within limits. Any
sound education is both authoritarian
and free.
The "hidden assumptions" of sec
ular education concerning God, Christ,
and man are unacceptable to our au
thor. God cannot be disregarded in
any sane education. "Christ cannot be
dismissed except at our bitter cost."
Man is not born free in any absolute
sense. Relativism in morals has been
the logical result of disregard for au
thority.
Toward a solution of the problem
which confronts us, due to secularism
in education, the author suggests that
the Church and the home must do a
better and more extensive service in
Christian education. The center of the
education process in which the Church
and home engages must be Christ, Son
of Man and Son of God.
The closing chapter of the book
deals with man's response. The crux
of this response is faith. The author's
analysis of faith will not be altogether
satisfactory to all readers, for the
faith which brings salvation is quite
unique and does not lend itself well
by way of comparison with faith in
other areas of life. The faith which is
man's response is not only a single,
separated act but is also a life faith
and is generated by prayer.
Faith, however, is not man's only
res])onse. Daily action is also essen
tial. Faith and prayer must be trans
lated into and supported by deeds
which are Christian, It is "faith
which works' by love." It is works
without which faith is dead.
Christ and Man's Dilemma should
be read by every minister of the Gos
pel. It contains a stirring r.iessage for
our day when secularism and sensate
piiilosophy have almost usurped the
field of modern thought. Conservative
thinkers will rejoice in Hr. Buttrick's
presentation.
W. D. TUUKINGTON
The Theology of -John Wesley. With
special rcferoice to the doctrine oi
justification, by William R. Can
on. New York: Abingdon-Cokes-
bury Press, 1946. 284 pp. |2.50.
It is a wholesome thing for scholars
to re-examine the springs of a vital
religious movement such as Method
ism, for by doing so they can help pre
vent a lack of power due to ignorance
of first principles. Dr. Cannon has
presented us with a stimulating study
of \Vesley's theology, written with
care and vigor. The treatment is
largely objective, so that responsibility
for the views set forth is placed upon
Wesley himself. Certain comments, if
taken alone, seem to carry at least a
suggestion of the economic view of the
Trinity, which is abroad in the land
(pp, 161, 214).
Essentially, the work is sound. At
Yale, this reviewer enjoyed Cannon's
friendship Avhile both were woi king on
doctor's dissertations in somewhat re
lated fields. He was known on the
campus for his conservative position,
as we understand he now is at Emory
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University.
Tlie manner in wliich Wesley's doc
trines are placed against the back
ground of Anglican and other views is
especially worth while. Wesley's
Aldersgate experience is pointed out as
a turning point in his theology, being
the point at which he personally
grasped the way of salvation by faith.
It is pointed out that, instead of a
sterile theology, Wesley stood for a
form of doctrine that led to a real
change in the lives of men. This
change is not at first so complete, how
ever, as to free one from "all inward
desires that are evil," which must be
progressively overcome (p. 250).
Though not coming from the ranks
of the holiness movement, and thougli
centering on the doctrine of justifica
tion in this study, the author has seen
the fact that in Wesley's view Chris
tian perfection "is the free gift of
God" (p. 212). The book ends with
these words :
Justification, in the last analysis, is not super
seded ; it is transfigured and transformed, for
the same Lord who is rich in mercy and plen
teous in redemption is able also to do exceeding
abundantly above all that we ask or think and,
according to the power that worketh in us, to
deliver us from the bondage of sin and to make
us conformable to the blessed image of his Son.
(p. 254.)
The careful student of Wesley will
value this book, which ranks favorably
among the volumes written upon th;3
subject of historic Methodisni, Dr.
Cannon deals with ideas rather than
with the history of external farts, so
that his work makes a welcome con
tribution to Wesleyan literature. It
should be helpful to the serious stu
dent of Arminian litei'ature in this
day.
C. Elvan OL?,rsrBAr>
Calvinism, by A. Dakin. Philadeli)h*a :
Westminster Press, 1916. 223 pp.
12.75.
There has come in our day a revival
of interest in Calvin and Calvinism.
One reason for it is this : our world is
bristling with problems, and many of
them are the very ones Calvin wrestled
with in his famous Institutes. A grow
ing number of thinkers are turning to
Calvinism for help and guidance as
they strive to cope with these acute
problems. Even though they may not
be able to accept C alvin's proffeied
solutions they find in them many vig
orous suggestions an.d a point of de-
})arture for their own thinking at
least.
This interest is world-wide. In Hun
gary, France, Germany, Holland and
elsewhere new biographies of Calvin,
new translations of the Institafes,
handbooks and commentaries have ap
peared. The most significant move
ment, signalling the revival of Calvin
ism, is, of course, Barthianism. "In
and through Barth it is found that
many of the fundamental notes of Cal
vin's theology are capable of modern
statement in such a way as to win
favorable consideration, and the ques
tion ine .'itably arises whether they are
not of permanent value for Christian
thinking."
The author sees a violent reaction
from the theology which has developed
"since the time when Arminianism tri
umphed over Calvinism.'' Since Wes
ley's day there has been a growing sen-
timentalism in religion with the em
phasis upon the fatherhood of God and
the idea of his love. Not that Armin
ianism or W esleyanism were in any
manner responsible for the rise of
modernism, but they were perhaps
landmarks in the progress towards the
new outlook which made man the cen
ter of thought rather than God. This
was reinforced by the nineteenth cen
tury idealism which expressed unlimit
ed faith in man's ability. Other hu
manistic doctrines, such as the im
manence of God, the idea that God is
discoverable by the processes of
thought without revelation, and that
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religious experience can form an ade
quate basis of theology have led to an
"interpretation of Christianity far re
moved from that of the New Testa
ment."
The book is designed "to give a con
cise statement of what Calvinism is,
and some indication of its influence."
As such it is something of a commen
tary on the InstituteSy an exposition of
the doctrines and ethics of Christian
ity as interpreted by Calvin. To those
who are instructed in the specific
teachings of Calvinism, the doctrinal
part may not be of paramount interest
save as some of the traditional inter
pretations may here and there be some
what revised.
Part Two deals with Calvinism as
an ecclesiastical system in various
lands. Geneva was the base, and this
was regarded as the pattern for all
new organizations to follow. But the
nmster-plan was modified perforce as
Calvinism adapted itself to varying
conditions in other sections of Swit
zerland, Germany, the Netherlands,
France, and the English-speaking
world. The author does not exaggerate
in saying that "it did much to teach
ordinary men to organize, to set them
to the task, and to supply them with
guiding lines for it. For this, if for
nothing more. Protestantism and the
democracies of the world owe the Gen
evan Reformer an incalculable debt."
Part Three deals with some aspects
of Calvinism. These include the Cal
vinistic view of Scripture, the prin
ciple of Authority in Calvinism, the
Calvinistic way of life, and Calvinism
and the social order. Many interest
ing and pertinent truths are discussed,
some misapprehensions of Calvin's
teaching are corrected, and some of his
positions are freely criticised.
The author sees "affinities between
the spirit and underlying aim of the
Barthian theology and the social and
political aspirations of the continent
of Europe." If Barthianism should
come to terms with the political aspi
rations of our world, then "we might
well see a revived Calvinism forming
the theological background of a new
constructive and inter-national life."
Wilder R. Reynolds
Faith and Reason, by Nels F. S. Ferre.
New York : Harpers, 1916. xii, 251
pp. 12.50.
This book, in the field of philosophy
of religion, is the first volume of a
projected work on "Reason and the
Christian Faith" by the professor of
Christian theology at Andover Newton
Theological School. The second vol
ume, soon to appear, will be entitled,
"Faith, Society, and the Problem of
Evil." The treatise before us is anoth
er attempt to reconcile faith and
reason, this time a good one.
Since past methods and conclusions
in science, philosophy, and religion
are being questioned, the author
pleads for a re-examination of all
methods of knowing, in the light of all
that we know. The dogmatic attitude
has been self-defeating. One of the
most serious flaws among thinkers is
the "psychological tendency," i. e.,
"the natural temptation to identify
one's profession and intellectual posi
tion with public prestige and/or inner
security." (p. 54). For example, some
religionists claim that the world is to
be saved only by their particular way
of salvation.
Chapter I assays to clarify the
meanings and relationships between
religion and reason. "Religion is our
whole-reaction to what we consider to
be most important and most real." (p.
5). Right reason is "the fullest and
most consistent explanation of what
is now and here actual based on the
most thorough description of it and
such reasoning beyond it as may be
warranted by the facts found within
what is here and now actual." (p. 22).
The central problem of the book is
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whether right reason and right whole-
reaction do or can go together. Reason
and religion, Ferre later in the book
suggests, are' ultimately indistinguish
able.
The other three chapters, wliich with
the first chapter comprise the main
body of the volume, show the proper
spheres and inter-relationships of the
Circles of Science, Philosophy, and
Religion respectively. Each of these
areas must be carefully cultivated if
we are to get at truth ; for truth is like
a field in which oats, rye, and wheat
are to be haiwested, each requiring its
own peculiar threshing screen. The
chapters on science and philosophy
are the strongest. They are, too, the
most readable. Thirteen logical and
psychological "tendencies" are out
lined, against which science needs to
be on guard if she would arrive at the
truth. Philosophy and theology are
defined at length. We find the truth
that saves only as we seek the full
interpretation of fact (philoso-ib.y)
and the full interpretation of faith
(theology). The three standards of
philosophy are inclusiveness, coher
ence, and objectivity; of religion�in
clusiveness, coherence, and subjectiv
ity. Philosophy and theology differ
not only in function but in standards
of truth and contents of coherence.
The one is coherence of the actual, the
here and now; the other coherence
"goes beyond the present stage of
process." (pp. 22, 124). This differ
ence of coherence between 7)liiloso];hy
and theology constitutes one of the
major theses of the book. Ferre caUs
for a more effective philosophy of reli
gion, one that will resist the tempta
tion to make itself into a substitute
for theology. The Circles of Science
and Philosophy can be drawn. But no
human compass can draw the Circle
of Religion. It concerns itself with
the "Most High," which cannot be
measured. The interpretation of the
existential ultimate is its chief busi
ness. It includes knowledge but is not
centered in it. "It is the highest delec-
tive event that most fully and most
meaningfully lights up all else." (p.
214).
The reader will long for a more spe
cific Christian commitment from the
author. His treatment of religion is
too general, too ambiguous. The terms
"theology" and "religion" are some
times used with disturbing confusion.
Many a reader will proceed the more
haltingly through this already com-
]�licated text because of the author's
usage of uncommon theological terms
such as, "selective actual," "selective
ideal," "dynamic-self-verification,'" and
"reflexive superspective." A more
straightforward diction would
strengthen the treatment. Mr. Ferre
fails to make clear, furthermore, just
what the "concrete content" should be
to which his definition of religion
would fit in. It will be agreed, never
theless, that "Faith and Reason" is a
most stimulating and challenging
book. Its author for the most part
tackles his problems squarely, without
bias and without ignoring the rational
difficulties involved. The next volume
will be eagerly anticipated, b^it only
by the initiated. JNlr. Ferre has prom
ised to deal more fully there with some
of the issues that are raised in the
book now being reviewed.
Jambs D. RoBBRrsoN
The Basis of Christian Faith , by Floyd
E. Hamilton. Third revised edi
tion, New York : Harper & Broth
ers, 1946, 354 pages.
'
12.50.
It speaks well for a book when pop
ular demand makes imperative a third
edition. The former editions (of 1927
and 1933) of The Basis of Chn^<tian
Faith were designed to serve as a text
book at the college level in apologetic
courses of a non-technical character.
As such, they were designed to touch
the field of Christian ai)ologetics at all
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of its principal points, avoiding on the
one hand the expenditure of time on
aspects of controversy which were not
of contemporary concem, and on the
other, a too-technical treatment of the
material in hand which might discour
age the undergraduate.
The present revision seeks the same
objectives, and aims to supplement the
former editions at the point of those
areas affected by newer discoveries in
atomic physics and genetics, and by
newer trends in New Testament crit
icism. A review of such a volume
must be undertaken in the spirit of
sympathy with the needs of the under
graduate whose confidence in the es
sentials of the Christian message has
been disturbed by a non-Christian
system of education. Thus Professor
Hamilton's work should be judged in
the light of its effectiveness in the
accomplishment of this task.
In an attempt to cover the entire
field of apologetics, he has found it
necessary to sacrifice thoroughness ;
and in so doing he hay left some state
ments open to attack from the more
critical type of reader. For exam])le,
notice his use of the term 'innate
ideas' in speaking of time, space, ex
istence, and cause. Perhaps a happier
term might have been employed. Pro
fessor Hamilton is on more certain
ground in his discussion of such topics
as "The Reasonableness of Supernat
uralism," "The Unity of the Bible,"
"Old Testament Criticism," "and "The
Resurrection of Jesus Christ."
Beyond his specific handling of his
factual material, our author is vigor
ous in his insistence that the oppo
nents of historic Christianity are op
erating upon the basis of certain as
sumptions which are open to question.
Welcome is his clear view of the r61e
of initial premises in the erection of
systems of thought. He may prejudice
his case with some, in his emphasis
(fundamentally correct in the opinion
of some of us) upon the element of
will in belief. In other words, he has
touched upon a sensitive point in the
mind of the 'modern man' in his ob
servation that "Men will ignore all
possible solutions of a diflflcult passage
that would remove contradictions,
and seize upon the one possible inter
pretation that would produce a dis
crepancy, and then insist that the
Bible must be wrong." (p. 273.)
On the whole, the volume is far from
superficial; while it is pitched at the
college level, it embodies observations
which are basically significant, and
which do not come amiss to conserv
atives in more advanced stages of prep
aration. A constructive conservative
apologetic must have both method and
direction ; both of these are indicated
in Professor Hamilton's book, the
study of which ought to lay the foun
dation for more advanced study in the
field.
Harold B. Kuhn
Doom and Resurrection, by Joseph L.
Hronuidka. Richmond, Virginia:
Madrus House, 1915. 122 pages.
12.00.
The late war brought to our shores
a number of able thinkers, among
whom ^yas the author of Doom and
Resurrection. Dr. Hromadka took ref
uge in Switzerland when the armies
of Hitler invaded his native Czecho
slovakia, and has been for five years
professor in Princeton Theological
Seminary. Out of his rich background
as professor of theology in the Univer
sity of Prague, he gives in brief com
pass a penetrating analysis of the
causes of the decay of our modern cul
ture. Representing in his own way the
theological tradition known as The
Dialectical Theology, our author seeks
to show the relevance of the issues of
sin, salvation, human destiny, eternal
life, and God in an age of catastrophe
� an age in which the loss of the sense
of the Truth is a factor more to be
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dreaded than the loss of economic se
curity.
The volume is one of a series which
has appeared in our generation, whose
purpose is to protest the tendency in
modem theology to "domesticate
Christ and His majestic truth and to
subordinate Him to our 'religious ex
perience'." Its author pleads for a re
newal of the consciousness of the "sa
cred line between good and evil, right
and wrong, God and devil," and illus
trates his point by reference to a group
of prophets not well known to the
average English reader.
Most writings of this type make pri-
maiy reference to Kierkegaard; it is
refreshing to find an appeal to Feodor
Dostoyevski, who saw behind the im
pending breakdown of Europe's polit
ical and economic system to the dis
solution of the invisible pillars of its
moral order. Dr. Hromadka sees in
j>ostoyevski the literary expression of
his own theme, namely resurrection
beginning only at the bottom of hu
manity's abyss. In addition, he has
rendered us a valuable service in in
troducing to the English reader the
thought of Thomas Masaryk and his
pupil, Emanuel RMl.
Masaryk appears as the appreciative
but critical eclectic, who read with pa
tience Kant, Fichte, Comte, Hegel,
Marx and Goethe, but finally found in
Jesus "the synthesis of truth, respon
sible freedom, and love." Radl, con
tinuing his master's regard for the
peoples of the Anglo-Saxon West,
seems to have seen better than most in
Britain and in America the factors
Avhich were precipitating the spiritual
crisis in America: "The breakdown of
the pre-war revivalism, the waning of
Puritanism, the economic convulsions,
religious relativism, and naturalistic
trends in theology, the growing indif
ference toward missionary programs
. . . ." (p. 81)
Chapter V, entitled "The Crisis and
Theology" is enlightening as an expo
sition, from a somewhat novel point
of view, of the Dialectical Theology.
Dr. Hromddka seems to find the cure
for the sickness of our culture, not in
the prescriptions of the Slavonic con
sultants (Dostoyevski, Masaryk and
Rddl) but in Karl Barth, and especial
ly the Bar-th of The Epistle to the Ro
mans (second and subsequent edi
tions). In this work the theologian of
Basel is considered to have pointed to
"the only unshakable rampart of
thought and action, to the majestic
authority of the revealed God, to the
God of the Old and New Testaments."
Our author apparently prefers this
Barth to the Barth of the Dogmatik.
It is hoped that this review will
serve to whet the appetite of many
readers to study this keenly diagnostic
work. Without agreeing with the con
cessiveness of Dr. Hromadka toward
liberal historical criticism, the reader
will find much to stimulate his thought
with respect to the contemporary
world scene. Some may be frightened
by the author's dedication of the book
to Henry A. Wallace, or distressed by
its lack of an index. Most will wonder
why it has had so little attention from
reviewers.
Harold B. Kuhn
Damd the King, by Gladys Schmitt.
New York : Dial Press, 1916. 631
pages. $3.00.
It is not surprising that the charac
ter of David, embodying in such large
measure both the practical and the
poetic, should hold an attraction for
the literary mind no less than for the
mind of the student of history. Once
again the novelist has undertaken the
task of delineating the son of Jesse,
this time from a point of view which
render-s the book an object of no little
concern to the Christian mind.
The broadest characterization of the
volume is that it is a product of the
"debunking" era � an era which some
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of us fervently hoped might before
now have come to an end. Specifically,
Miss Schmitt has sought more earnest
ly to make a 'best seller' than to por
tray faithfully her character. She has
majored upon the inconsistencies in
David's life; one gains the impression
that she has grossly overplayed the
mystic strain in David, as a result of
abnormal stress upon his rdle as a
lyricist.
Turning to specific criticisms, this
reviewer cannot avoid the conviction
that the author has played fast and
loose with the facts in the record of
David's life. With a complete disre
gard for the spirit of Biblical antiqui
ty, she presents the life of David as a
series of peccadilloes, strung together
with miscellaneous and relatively un
important military and political activ
ities. In this respect, the volume ap
pears to have been written to appeal
to the mentality which lifted Stein
beck's Grapes of Wrath to the place of
a liest-seller.
Lest it seem that the reviewer's com
ments are but the product of squeam-
ishness, let it be said that Miss Schmitt
has accepted, with a naivete almost
charming, the conclusions of liberal
criticism of the Old Testament. Illus
trative of this is her categorical attri
bution of the slaying of Goliath to El-
hanan; any serious student of the Old
Testament knows that even scholars
of the more liberal schools of criticism
recognize a problem at this point too
diificult to be dismissed with gaiety.
Again, she has accepted without criti
cism the view that Samuel was a froth
ing ecstatic; by making young David
to note the "foam of prophecy" upon
his mouth, she betrays a cavalier dis
regard for the active possibility that
while there were doubtless wandering
bands of ecstatics, Samuel may have
been in the category of the articulate
prophets. Again, she consistently em
ploys the aiternative -baal forms of
the names of Ishbosheth and Mephi-
bosheth as though no possible doubt
could exist with respect to the original
naming of these men.
These samples are characteristic of
the handling of the religion of Israel
throughout the volume. Miss Schmitt
obviously belittles the place of religion
in the life of David, and makes his
regard for Jehovah too largely a mat
ter a matter of the-tongue-in-the-cheek.
Characteristically, David's view of
God is dynamic; toward the close of
his life, he is portrayed as a disap
pointed cynic, whose "God neither sees
nor hears" or elsewhere as an erotic
pantheist, who desires to be reunited
with the Everlasting Being from
Whom he has been absent for a little
while, and Whom he has really been
seeking in his amorous pursuits. This
is, of course, an interpretation wholly
unsupported by the records and re
flects the general tendency of our au
thor to lack seriousness in treating her
character.
Of the many portrayals which evi
dence the author's opaqueness to reli
gious values, one may be cited as an
example, namely that of her treatment
of David's repentance following the
visit of Nathan. Here Miss Schmitt in
her usual facile manner turns his at
titude from that of penitence to one
of self-justification, which is mingled
with a desire to be done with the cus
tomary period of mourning. His sup
posed soliloquy completely subverts
the element of repentance : "O God
whom I do not know, I bitterly repent
that I have murdered Uriah the Hit-
tite. But I rejoice in the depth of my
bowels that I have taken his wife to
be my beloved. I have sinned griev
ously in Your (sic) sight. And yet I
am a better man in the days of my sin
than I was in the days of my guilt-
nessness."
It goes without saying that the vol
ume will serve to type the opinion of
the uncritical reader with respect to
David for some time to come. This re
view takes for granted that multitudes
who never read / and // Samuel are
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reading David the King. It is probable
that long after the connoisseurs of lit
erature, whose jaded appetites will re
ceive a middle-sized thrill from the
book, have forgotten it, the unthinking
will accept as gospel Miss Schmitt's
literary rehash of the more negative
features of historical criticism. In the
long run her distorted portrayal of
David's religion will prove more dam
aging than the overemphasis upon the
element of sex in the volume, done as
it is to emphasize the motif expressed
by Cathal O'Toole on the book's jacket,
that of evoking "the story of God's
most magnificent sinner."
Books of tliis type, which overplay
their materials, have a tendency to be
ultimately self-defeating. Perhaps it
will be so with David the King. Mean
while Israel's Psalmist and his reli
gion stand in the pillory.
Harold B. Kuhn
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